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ABSTRACT
THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON THE MINDANAO 
RESISTANCE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Michael Anthony Balis 
Old Dominion University, 1990 
Director: Dr. Willard C. Frank, Jr.
This thesis examines the American participation in the 
development of resistance against the Japanese on Mindanao 
Island in the Philippines, 1942-1945. Americans directed 
the overall resistance movement and commanded most of 
the provinces. As leaders Americans played a key role in 
the evolution of the resistance from an independent 
guerrilla force to a partisan force that gave U.S. forces 
combat and intelligence assistance. The most important 
information for the thesis came from the MacArthur Archives, 
the Hayden Papers at the University of Michigan, the U.S. 
Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, and 
correspondence with 14 men who served with the Mindanao 
resistance.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the American participation in the 
development of resistance against the Japanese on Mindanao 
Island, 1942-1945. In December 1941, Japanese forces 
launched their attacks against United States forces at Pearl 
Harbor and in the Philippines and British forces in South 
East Asia. The Japanese also invaded the U.S.-controlled 
Philippine Islands on 8 December 1941 and swept through them 
in a six-month campaign. Filipino and American forces under 
General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Army, were stationed on 
Mindanao until their surrender to Japanese forces in May 
1942. The thesis examines the activities of Americans 
remaining on Mindanao after May 1942 who did not accept 
defeat and who resisted the Japanese.
This thesis contains several subtopics. It treats the 
island1s fall to the Japanese in 1942 and how subsequent 
Japanese abuse of the population led to indigenous 
resistance. It analyzes how three indigenous and four 
American leaders organized the independent guerrilla groups. 
It explores how Colonel Wendell Fertig, U.S. Army Reserve, 
unified the separate guerrilla groups. It explains 
conflicts between Fertig and three Mindanaoan leaders over 
the establishment of Fertig!s authority and the resolutions 
of those conflicts in an effort to see how unified command
1
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developed. It treats Japanese military operations against 
the American-led resistance in order to clarify the dangers 
the resistance faced. It analyzes the development of the 
resistance by its passive and active reactions to Japanese 
military pressure. It examines the role of MacArthur's 
headquarters, which supplied and directed Fertig beginning 
in January 1943 in converting an independent guerrilla force 
into a partisan force that followed U.S. Army orders. It 
also analyzes the contributions of Fertig and his province 
commanders in this evolution. It finally asks how 
operations in support of American forces that landed or the 
island in 1945 made the Mindanao resistance a true partisan 
force.
There are significant differences between guerrilla 
and partisan warfare. The most important difference is 
control. A guerrilla force is independent of outside 
military command. It may choose to assist a military force 
at times that its leaders are free to decide. Because the 
guerrilla force is not allied with a military force, its war 
is usually more protracted.1 A partisan unit is a 
resistance force that is directly under military orders.
Its missions include direct combat support, intelligence 
gathering, rescuing prisoners, cutting communications and 
harassing enemy movements. Because of the average 
partisan's lack of training in communications and
1Mao Tse Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: 
Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1961), 72.
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intelligence, his activities usually require the supported 
military force to instruct the partisan in those tasks. The 
arms and ammunition supplied by an allied military 
organization gives the partisans firepower superior to that 
of a guerrilla force.2
Guerrilla and partisan warfare share some 
similarities. Brutal foreign invaders or harsh indigenous 
leaders can anger people so much that they fight their 
enemies through partisan or guerrilla war. Successful 
guerrillas and partisans respect civilian property; so, they 
earn the indigenous population's support. Both require such 
support to survive and grow. Successful groups receive 
supplies, shelter, recruits, and intelligence from friendly 
inhabitants. Most guerrillas and partisans use their 
superior knowledge of the terrain to ambush the usually 
better-armed enemy troops and then disperse to avoid costly 
battles.3
Because the guerrilla missions change to include 
intelligence gathering and combat support of military 
operations, the transition to partisan warfare requires 
articulate and flexible leadership. Fertig and his four
20tto Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare (New York; Praeger 
Publishers, 1962), 75-77; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 
trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 479-83.
3Lewis Gann, Guerrillas in History (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1979), 78-93; Gerard Chaliand, Guerrilla 
Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to 
Afghanistan (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1982), 1-32.
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American commanders were sufficiently persuasive to convince 
local peasants and townspeople that organized guerrilla 
warfare would protect their families from Japanese 
brutality. The guerrilla leaders earned widespread respect 
from the indigenous people who in turn supported the 
guerrillas with clothing, shelter, recruits, and 
information. MacArthur appointed Fertig to command the 
Mindanao resistance and transform it into a partisan force. 
Since Fertig earned the respect of the major guerrilla 
leaders, he convinced them to come under his command. After 
Fertig established his authority over the separate guerrilla 
units, the guerrillas fell under military authority and they 
became partisans who first collected and sent intelligence 
to MacArthur and later supported his landings on Mindanao.
The most important documents for this thesis came from 
the MacArthur Archives in Norfolk, Virginia. Documents in 
Record Group 16 include MacArthur's orders to Fertig,
Fertig's reports on the strength and growth of the 
resistance, as well as on Japanese activities. Record Group 
3 contains Japanese reports on the Mindanao resistance 
including partisan radio station locations, directives on 
counter-partisan operations, and data on combat results.
The General Robert Eichelberger Papers at Duke 
University has post-war interviews with Japanese generals 
who served on Mindanao that describe Japanese 
counter-partisan operations, Japanese defense plans, as well 
as partisan activities in 1944 and 1945.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The Joseph Hayden Papers at the University of Michigan 
contain a valuable report made by an American schoolteacher, 
Edward Kuder, who fought the Japanese alongside the Moslem 
Moro resistance. Kuder describes their contributions to the 
resistance and was a witness to much that he describes. He 
provides key answers on how the Moslems resisted.
John Keats's book, They Fought Alone, is a good 
secondary source on Fertig's view of the resistance. It is 
not documented, but other works in the MacArthur Archives 
support most of his facts. Keats had access to Fertig's 
diary which was unavailable to the author. Keats portrays 
Fertig and Captain Charles Hedges, U.S. Army Reserve, as the 
only important leaders.4
American guerrillas wrote four useful books. Because 
Return to Freedom by Colonel Sam Grashio, U.S. Air Force, 
and Bernard Norling contains cross-references to other books 
on the Mindanao resistance, it is the best book in this 
category. Grashio describes partisan activities in the 
Agusan Province. Rice and Salt by Brigadier General John 
McGee, U.S. Army, summarizes the origins and growth of 
resistance in the Zamboanga Province based cn his service 
with the partisans. Never Sav Die by Colonel Jack Hawkins, 
U.S. Marine Corps, discusses his four-month service in the 
Agusan Province resistance. Philippine Diarv by Colonel 
Steve Mellnick, U.S. Army, is more emotional than the
4John Keats, They Fought Alone (New York and 
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1963).
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others. However, documentary evidence supports much of his 
account.5
Thirteen Americans and one Australian who fought with 
the resistance were generous enough to provide this author 
with information. They were Colonel Robert Bowler, U.S. 
Army; Lieutenant Sam Grashio, U.S. Army Air Forces; Captain 
Erling Jonassen, U.S. Army; Major Rex Blow, Royal Australian 
Army; Captain Paul Marshall, U.S. Army; Sergeant Ken Newton, 
U.S. Army Air Forces; Lieutenant Robert Merchant, U.S. Army; 
Captain Robert Spielman, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Gerald 
Chapman, U.S. Army Air Forces; Lieutenant Iliff Richardson, 
U.S. Navy; Lieutenant Colonel Clyde Childress, U.S. Army; 
Chief Petty Officer Ellwood Offret, U.S. Navy; Lieutenant 
Colonel Austin Schofner, U.S. Marine Corps; and Dr. William 
Johnson, DDS. All of these men gave clear and candid 
answers to this author's questions. Because they gave 
information on battles, partisan tactics and the role that 
Americans played in the resistance which is not found 
elsewhere, their perspectives have contributed much to this 
thesis.
This thesis attempts a comprehensive examination of 
the American-led resistance groups on Mindanao Island. It
5Jack Hawkins, Never Sav Die (Philadelphia: Dorrance 
and Co., 1966); Samuel Grashio and Bernard Norling, Return 
to Freedom (Tulsa: MCN Press, 1982); Steve Mellnick, 
Philippine Diarv 1941-1945 (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold 
Co., 1969) ; John McGee, Rice and Salt: A History of the 
Defense and Occupation of Mindanao During World War Two (San 
Antonio: The Naylor Co., 1963).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
is based on archival and secondary sources as well as 
personal correspondence. Japanese reports on the partisans 
American partisan accounts, and official U.S. Army messages 
made it possible to analyze the resistance from varied 
perspectives.
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CHAPTER 1 
ORIGINS OF RESISTANCE
In December 1941, Japan's and America's national 
interests collided. The U.S. believed that Japanese 
expansion in China and Indo-China would eventually threaten 
American interests in the Pacific; so, the Americans refused 
to sell oil to Japan. The Japanese believed that they could 
not maintain their empire without American oil imports.
Japan saw this as a conspiracy by a loose coalition of the 
United States, Britain, and the government of the 
Netherlands in exile to weaken her militarily and 
economically. The Japanese government under General Hideki 
Tojo believed the United States would then attack Japan. 
After Japan's border clashes with the Soviets in 1939, Tojo 
expected the Soviets to invade Japanese held territory in 
China and Manchuria. The Japanese thought that a desperate 
gamble such as striking the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii and 
seizing the oil rich Dutch East Indies was preferable to 
letting their empire crumble to the inevitable U.S.,
British, Dutch, and Soviet pressure. The United States 
believed that if she strengthened her relations with 
Britain, the Netherlands, and China, she would deter the 
Japanese from attacking the Philippines and other U.S. 
possesions. The American government became even more
8
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determined to check Japanese aggression when Japan allied 
herself with Germany and Italy. The Japanese attacked the 
U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and 
destroyed two battleships, damaged six others, crippled 
three destroyers, and damaged three light cruisers. This 
stunned the U.S. Pacific Fleet and left the Philippines, 
Malaya, and Dutch East Indies open to conquest.1
The Japanese campaign to capture the Philippines 
lasted from December 1941 to May 1942. Japan landed her 
main invasion force in the Philippines on 10 December 1941. 
Those islands contained important natural resources needed 
by her war industry, and the archipelago was an important 
part of the island shield Japan was building across the 
Pacific against U.S. forces. Japanese planes would have 
many airfields to launch attacks on U.S. invasion fleets. 
Japanese ground forces would gain mountainous and jungle 
covered islands that were easy to fortify. The Japanese 
14th Army under General Masaharu Homma forced MacArthur's 
forces in Luzon to retreat to the Bataan Peninsula and 
Corregidor Island early in 1942. The rest of Homma's army 
swept across the Visayas in April and May 1942. Because of 
their low supplies and the hopelessness of rescue by the
1Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy 1941-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1978), 1-103; Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The 
American War with Japan (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 62- 
65; Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia 
and the Pacific. Origins of Modern Wars Series, ed. Harold 
Hearder (New York: Longman, 1987), 168-86.
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U.S. Pacific Fleet, further resistance by the Americans and 
Filipinos became meaningless. MacArthur left Lieutenant 
General Jonathan Wainwright, U.S. Army, in command of the 
Philippines and went to Australia to prepare a 
counteroffensive against the Japanese.2
Most of the Filipino and American troops on Mindanao 
were not trained or equipped to go into combat with the 
Japanese force. The 101st and 102nd Philippine Army 
Divisions were stationed on Mindanao. Major General William 
Sharp, U.S. Army, commanded the island's garrison beginning 
in January 1942. Both divisions were understrength in 
trained infantrymen; so, policemen and artillerymen 
bolstered them. There was too little ammunition for 
training troops on a firing line; so, the U.S. and Filipino 
soldiers never learned to fire live ammunition.3 Most of 
their weapons were from the First World War; so, they had 
many damaged and obsolete parts. Because ammunition for 
their World War I mortars had not been made since 1918, a 
commander ordered his unit to push the mortars over a cliff. 
Some American officers were relatively new to the island,
2John Toland, The Rising Sun; The Decline and Fall of 
the Japanese Empire. 1936-1945 (New York; Bantam Books, 
1986), 109-10, 172, 180, 194; Paul Kennedy, Pacific 
Onslaught 7 December 1941-7 February 1943 (New York; 
Ballantine Books, 1972), 15-23, 55-69.
3Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines. 2d ed.,
U.S. Army in World War II Series (Washington, D.C.; Office 
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1978), 508.
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and they had a hard time communicating with the Filipinos.4
Sharp organized the island into five regions. Since 
each region had few useful roads, defense of the interior 
was relatively simple. Sharp ordered each defense region to 
hold the Japanese as long as possible in the hope 
reinforcements would arrive before the Del Monte airfields 
near Cagayan were lost.5 Sharp lacked a friendly navy; so, 
he could not intercept and destroy the Japanese invasion 
force at sea. Sharp only planned to defend likely landing 
areas near Cagayan and Cotabato cities.
The Japanese completed their Mindanao invasion plan 
while the U.S. garrison struggled to prepare its defenses.
As Mindanao's airfields and ports were useful staging areas 
for Japanese troops destined for the invasion of the Dutch 
East Indies, the Japanese planned to capture the island.
The Japanese plan was to land at Macajalar Bay, the Moro 
Gulf, and Davao Gulf. Each landing force contained no more 
than 5,000 of men in an effort to push the U.S. forces 
inland along the Sayre Road and Highway One and encircle 
them. The Japanese planned to use their superior air and
4Ken Newton, Sergeant, U.S. Army Air Forces, (ret.), 
letter to author, 24 July 1989; Charles Willoughby,
"Critique of Morton's Fall of the Philippines," Record Group 
[hereafter RG] 23, Box 12, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, 
Virginia [hereafter MA].
5Sharp to All Sector Commanders and Force Reserves, 24 
February 1942, "U.S. Army Forces Far East Headquarters, 
Mindanao Force Directive," 5 March 1942, RG 30, Box 24, MA.
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armor to crush the final U.S. defense positions.6
Needing the Davao City port on Mindanao to stage their 
invasion of the Dutch East Indies scheduled for January 
1942, the Japanese sent a battalion of 1,000 men under 
Lieutenant Colonel Toshio Miura to capture the port on 
20 December 1941. Miura pushed Colonel Roger Hilsman's 
900-man force from the Davao-Digos area and secured it.7
The Kawaguchi Detachment of 4,852 men landed at Parang 
and Cotabato cities on 29 April 1942. Three infantry 
battalions, one artillery battalion deployed as infantry, 
and police troops defended this area. Three hundred 
Japanese attempted to outflank the defenders by going down 
the Mindanao River in barges on 31 April. This situation 
forced the sector commander, Colonel Russell Nelson, U.S. 
Army, to leave Highway One and move northeast to defend the 
trails that led to the Sayre Road. Other Kawaguchi units 
landed near Parang and faced a Filipino Rifle Regiment. The 
Japanese outflanked the Filipinos and forced them to retreat 
to Lanao Province.8
The island's defenders simultaneously contended with 
the Japanese Miura detachment which was reinforced to a 
strength of 4,000 men in April 1942. Colonel William
Norton, Fall of the Philippines. 508-9.
7Hilsman to Vachon, 26 January 1942, RG 30, Box 24,
MA; Morton, Fall of the Philippines. 507-19. The author 
does not know the level of training of the Miura Detachment 
or Hillsman's force.
Norton, Fall of the Philippines. 508-9.
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Graves, U.S. Army, took command of the Digos area from 
Hilsman. Until Graves's 2,000 men withdrew to secure the 
vital Kabacan Road junction against the Kawaguchi 
Detachment, the Americans and Filipinos conducted a skillful 
defense. The Americans and Filipinos successfully defended 
Kabacan and protected the 6,000 men at Cagayan and Del Monte 
from a Japanese attack in their rear until their 
surrender.9
The roughly 4,000-man Kawamura Detachment assaulted 
Macajalar Bay on 3 May 1942. Two artillery regiments and an 
infantry regiment defended the beach. Sharp committed his 
regimental reserve to halt Japanese flanking attacks along 
the Sayre Road. Enemy troops infiltrated the U.S. 
positions, which were defended by about 6,000 men, and the 
Japanese caused so much confusion among the U.S. and 
Filipino troops that the Kawamura Detachment knocked them 
out of two defense lines on the highway.10
Because the Japanese were on the verge of defeating 
U.S. forces in the Philippines, Sharp followed General 
Wainwright's May 1942 order to surrender. The Japanese 
broke the defense line near the important Del Monte 
airfields, while the entire U.S. Cotabato sector fell in 
April.11 Japanese troops had landed on Corregidor island
9Colonel Roger B. Hilsman, "The Occupation and 
Withdrawal from Davao," 26 January 1942, RG 30, Box 24, MA.
10Morton, Fall of the Philippines. 508-19.
11McGee, Rice and Salt, xviii.
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where Wainwright was with the last organized resistance, 
wainwright telegraphed Sharp that unless all U.S. forces 
surrendered, the Japanese would continue killing his men. 
Sharp then ordered his men to surrender.12
After the collapse of the U.S. and Filipino forces, 
Mindanao became a part of a Japanese Empire that was 
oppressive to conquered people throughout most of the Far 
East. It is unclear whether Japanese senior officers and 
national leaders or local commanders ordered the atrocities. 
A small group of Japanese scientists performed medical 
experiments on Manchurians while the Japanese troops 
followed a "Kill All, Burn All, Loot All" policy in Chinese 
cities and villages. For example, Japanese troops murdered 
more than 200,000 people in Nanking, China. The Japanese 
killed more than 60,000 Koreans in Japanese mines and 
factories. Japanese-run labor gangs killed more than 
100,000 Indonesians. Renegade Japanese patrols transferred 
the corporal punishment they received from their leaders to 
civilians and prisoners. Even pro-Japanese leaders like Ba 
Maw of Burma and Sukharno of Indonesia later turned against 
their harsh Japanese rulers.
The Japanese tried to instill fear into the Mindanao
12Wainwright to Sharp, 7 May 1942, RG 16, Box 7, MA;
D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur. vol. 2, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1975), 148.
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populace.13 They assigned no more than 10,000 men to rule 
over 1,000,000 Mindanaoans. The garrison's mission was to 
protect the ports at Davao, Zamboanga, and Cagayan from 
guerrillas. Japanese troops were concentrated around the 
cities of Zamboanga, Davao, Cagayan, and Surigao with 
smaller outposts deeper inside Mindanao tc gather food. In 
Mindanao, Japanese leaders believed that if they spread 
enough fear by public executions of suspected guerrillas and 
by controlling their movements that the islanders would be 
too afraid to rebel or to slow Japanese exploitation of 
Mindanao's wood, rice, and gold resources. Because many 
Japanese combat troops left Mindanao to fight Dutch ground 
forces in the East Indies, the Japanese garrison remaining 
on Mindanao was small. Although the Japanese believed that 
they had to instill fear in the indigenous population to 
rule them, they only assigned an insufficient 7,000 to 
10,000-man garrison for this task.14
The Japanese showed how little they understood the 
militant pride of the Moros, all of whom were Moslem. 
Catholic Spaniards and Filipinos had tried to convert the 
Moros to Christianity for 200 years; so, the Moros regarded
13John Dower, War Without Mercy; Race and Power in the 
Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 41-48; Saburo 
Ienaga, The Pacific War 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on 
Japan's Role in World War II (New York.: Pantheon Books, 
1978), 153-80.
14WYZB to MacArthur, 15 July 1943, RG 16, Box 17, MA; 
K«ats, They Fought Alone. 41-77, 91-103, 221; Cameron 
Forbes, The Philippine Islands, vol. 2, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1928), 49.
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any outsiders as a threat. Because there were incessant 
conflicts between Moro tribes and Christian Filipinos, each 
tribe, comprised of interrelated families, lived in forts 
under their spiritual and military leaders called Datus.
Any outsider who antagonized any of these tribes or families 
faced the danger of large tribal alliances forming and 
attacking them. However, Japanese patrols crossed Moro 
areas without permission. Moro territory was under a Datu's 
control, and he had hundreds of followers who were ready to 
fight to the death for him.15 Because the Datu’s followers 
might believe he could not control his own land, unannounced 
Japanese intrusions were a clear insult to him.16
The Japanese physically abused the Moros instead of 
trying to manipulate the latter's traditional hatred of 
Filipinos to their advantage. The Japanese believed that 
the Moros would be too intimidated to resist; so, the 
Japanese underestimated Moro guerrilla war traditions and 
family pride. The Japanese applied indiscriminate terror in 
an attempt to forestall a guerrilla movement. For example, 
Japanese slapped Moros for not bowing to them. They also 
suffocated them with water torture and stabbed them. If
15Ralph Thomas, Asia for Asiatics (Illigan City, 
Mindanao Island; Dunsalan Research Center, 1977), 1-5;
Thomas Kiefer, The Tausug: Violence and Law ir. a Philippine 
Moslem Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 
1972), 52-59, 121-33; Edward Kuder, "The Philippines Never 
Surrendered," Saturday Evening Post. 10 February 1945, 11.
16Kuder, "The Philippines Never Surrendered, "Saturday 
Evening Post. 24 February 1945, 23, 90.
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Japanese troops were sniped at, Japanese patrols razed 
entire villages. Japanese officers refused to meet with 
Moro leaders to discuss problems.17
The Japanese suppressed all political parties except 
for the collaborationist Kalipibi Party made up of Moros and 
Filipinos. This party consisted of those who tried to 
protect their villages by interceding in disputes between 
the Japanese and the local population, others who bargained 
to retain control over their land by supporting the 
Japanese, some who believed American troops would never 
return, and the sincerely pro-Japanese. The typical 
Filipino and Moro inwardly ignored this party and only 
pretended to obey it. They saw too much Japanese terrorism 
to believe in the goals of such a party. Villagers saw 
their prewar political leaders humiliated by the Japanese. 
For example, a Japanese soldier forced a Filipino mayor to 
climb a tree and get a coconut for him.18
From 1898 to 1911, Captain John J. Pershing's tactics 
in his pacification of Mindanao's Moros were the opposite of 
how the Japanese ruled the island in the Second World War. 
His accomplishments bring Japanese errors into clearer
17Thomas, Asia for Asiatics. 10; Kuder, "The 
Philippines Never Surrendered," Saturday Evening Post. 10 
February 1945, 58; Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in 
Mindanao (New York: Longman's Green and Co., 1946), 46.
18Charles Willoughby, The Guerrilla Resistance 
Movement in the Philippines (New York: Vantage Press, 1972), 
340-41; Erling Jonassen, Captain, U.S. Army (ret.) letter to 
author, 3 July 1989; Robert Bowler, Colonel, U.S. Army 
(ret.), letter to author, 30 September 1989.
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focus. Over 700,000 Moros lived in the Cotabato, Bukidnon, 
Lanao, and Zamboanga Provinces, and they were the only 
people on the island to oppose the Americans. Pershing knew 
that Moro resistance was best overcome with minimum force 
and a good understanding of Moro psychology. He used road 
construction, trading posts, and trade schools to calm Moro 
fears of a harsh American occupation. He also promised that 
Americans would not try to Christianize them.19
The Japanese occupiers also had to contend with 
Filipinos who were just as family-centered as the Moros. 
Their population of 536,729 was concentrated on the western, 
northern, and eastern coasts as well as Lanao Province.
Their cultural traditions obligated them to help their 
immediate family of parents, brothers, and sisters as well 
as their most distant relatives through any crisis. 
Professional alliances and ritual relatives called 
"compadres" added even more people to the group the Filipino 
had to assist at all times. He had to fight any outsider 
who threatened this large network or lose his family's 
respect and care. This support system made Filipino 
families very self-reliant.20
19Donald Smythe, Guerrilla Warrior (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1973), 23-193; Frank Vandiver, Black Jack 
(College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 142-314, 521-70.
20McGee, Rice and Salt. 150; Stanley Karnow, In Our 
Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random 
House, 1989), 20; Forbes, Philippine Islands 2:49; Teodoro 
Agoncillo, A Short History of the Philippines (New York: New 
American Library, 1969), 12-14.
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The Japanese threatened Filipino families with the 
"neighborhood association." Japanese troops made one man 
responsible for each section of a city or village. He had 
to inform the Japanese secret police, the "Kempei Tai," of 
all anti-Japanese activity or face the probability that the 
Japanese would execute or kidnap his closest relatives.
This Filipino was usually so afraid that the Japanese would 
discover unreported "crimes" in his village that he forced 
his subordinates to spy on their own neighbors. The 
Japanese took advantage of family outcasts and bribed them 
to turn in their neighbors and even their relatives. The 
Japanese imprisoned or executed these people along with 
their families. Because the Japanese forced some Filipinos 
to betray their distant relatives in order to protect their 
closest kin, this system made Filipinos hate the 
Japanese.21
The Japanese supplemented the above attack on the 
Filipino family with "zonification." The Japanese chose a 
collaborator to wear a mask before a lineup of suspects and 
identify suspected guerrillas. Because these spies usually 
lived among the indigenous population, these traitors were 
especially dangerous to the villagers and townspeople. They 
knew who had helped an American escape or who had spoken
21McGee, Rice and Salt. 150.
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badly of the Japanese.22
The "round up" was another direct Japanese attack on 
the Filipino culture. Because the most important matter to 
the Japanese was to crush any resistance and learn of 
information on threatening Filipino activities, their 
commanders issued very vague rules concerning villager 
welfare. The smallest unit employed in this tactic was a 
company of 100-200 troops. The Japanese surrounded a 
selected village before dawn. At first light, the troops 
moved into their assigned positions around the village. The 
Japanese kidnapped some men who were suspected of having 
firearms. The troops questioned their wives on their 
husbands' activities. If the Japanese did not get the 
necessary information on the firearm owners, they massacred 
the inhabitants. Filipinos were naturally furious about 
such brutality.23
The Japanese invasion broke down law and order in the 
Surigao, Agusan, and Lanao Provinces. The Japanese 
destroyed the police force that had fought the banditry of 
thieves and murderers before the war. The Japanese did not 
have a large enough garrison to control bandit violence. 
There were many bloody fights between Filipino and Moro
22Jose Reyes, Terrorism and Redemption (Manila: n.p., 
1945), 17; Fertig to MacArthur, 20 December 1943, RG 16, Box 18, MA.
^Allied Translator and Interpreter Service, Southwest 
Pacific Area Enemy Publications, "Intelligence Work and 
Round Up," 13 August 1944, RG 3, Box 129, MA.
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bandits near Kolambugan in the Lanao Province. Moros 
attacked and drove out Filipino Catholics near Malabang. A 
Filipino Catholic policeman responded to this by killing an 
unknown number of Moros. Filipino Catholics killed 200 
Moros in Cotabato province. Ex-soldiers led bandit gangs 
which terrorized many villages in Surigao and Agusan 
provinces. Such unrest frightened many law-abiding 
Filipinos and Moros.24
Because the Japanese did not learn from America's less 
violent method forty years earlier that Mindanaoan 
cooperation could best be attained with a good application 
of psychology and with minimum force, the Japanese garrison 
applied a violent and ineffective pacification policy. The 
island's Filipinos and Moros were very family-centered and 
ready to defend their relatives against indigenous or 
foreign enemies with guerrilla warfare. Moros had fought 
the Americans until they were satisfied that the Americans 
were not a threat to their culture. The brutal actions of 
the Japanese in 1942 caused the Filipino and Moro hatred 
that quickly precipitated a guerrilla war Japanese leaders 
wanted to avoid. Japanese soldiers therefore overreacted to
24Robert Spielman, "The History of the 114th Infantry 
Regiment" (M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1953), 19-22; 
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 130-36; Melinick, Philippine 
Diary. 241-45; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 537-39; 
Fertig to MacArthur, 25 October 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA; 
Joseph Kuder, "Kuder Report," Hayden Papers [hereafter HP], 
Box 41, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor [hereafter UM]; Jonassen letter; Bowler letter;
Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1980), 69-98.
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their fears of resistance and created a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.
t
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2 
SEVEN GUERRILLA GROUPS ARE FORMED
Popular anger required organization under leaders if 
it was to be converted to coordinated resistance among the 
Mindanaoans. Proper organization was the best way to insure 
that people performed important tasks and worked towards a 
common goal of attaining greater security from bandits and 
Japanese troops. Peasants also needed leaders to train them 
to shoot guns if they were to kill enough bandits and 
Japanese to protect their villages. If Filipinos were to 
survive outside Japanese-controlled areas, they needed civil 
governments that preserved law and solved food shortages by 
assigning certain people to try and jail criminals as well 
as ordering other people to plant food.
After May 1942, Mindanaoans responded to the Japanese 
threats to their society with resistance. The Japanese 
garrison was deployed in major cities along Mindanao's coast 
with the largest contingent at Davao. The Mindanaoans faced 
a harsh Japanese occupation and indigenous banditry which 
angered them. Former superintendents, officers, and foremen 
became the officers and sergeants of these first resistance 
groups. Soldiers who did not surrender added their training 
to these groups when they taught them the tactic of 
simultaneous fire. A few men from many villages throughout
23
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the island collected discarded and hidden guns and ambushed 
small Japanese groups. Since farmers, stevedores, soldiers, 
and construction workers were accustomed to group activity, 
they made the best guerrillas. Some leaders trained their 
volunteers for one to two months.1
Because the different guerrilla groups lacked overall 
control, they sometimes fought over territory and cultural 
differences. Some Lanao Province Moro guerrillas fought 
with Filipinos over land. Such activities started feuds 
between the small guerrilla bands and diverted them from 
fighting the Japanese. In Lanao Province, many Moro 
guerrilla groups refused to assist other Moros and 
especially Christians against the Japanese. Such 
animosities drove an even deeper wedge between existing Moro 
and Filipino guerrillas. The guerrilla leaders lacked 
authority to convince their men to concentrate on fighting 
the Japanese.2
From May to December 1942, several guerrilla leaders 
formed large guerrilla units to fight the Japanese troops 
and local bandits. All of them were strong-willed men who 
convinced leaders of smaller guerrilla groups to come under 
their command.
1Royce Wendover, "Foreshadows," The Royce Wendover 
Papers [hereafter WP], U.S. Army Military History Institute, 
Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania [hereafter CB].
2Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 130-36; "Kuder Report,"
HP, Box 41, UM; Fertig to MacArthur, 25 October 1943, RG 16, 
Box 1, MA.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
Salipada Pendatun, a Moro religious leader, understood 
the different cultures extant among the people and he had an 
excellent background for leading a large resistance force in 
the Cotabato Province. He administered Moslem universal law 
to hundreds of his followers. Pendatun used passages from 
the Koran to justify a war against the Japanese, and he 
maintained his religious leadership through spiritual and 
physical bravery in different tribal feuds. Furthermore, by 
his powerful personality Pendatun became very skillful in 
forming alliances.3 Pendatun also learned how to work with 
Americans and Filipinos at the University of the Philippines 
Law School. This experience later helped him lead Filipinos 
and Americans, who came from very different cultures. 
Military training in the University of the Philippines and 
wartime service in Davao Province, taught him basic military 
leadership skills.
Pendatun used family support to build a resistance 
group in the summer and fall of 1942. His brothers-in-law, 
who were also Moslem priests (Datus), joined his guerrilla 
force. Peasant families under these Datus were obligated 
under their law to stick together and fight under their 
strong leaders. One of the brothers-in-law was reputed to 
be one of the most influential leaders in Southeast 
Cotabato. As a result, these peasants gave Pendatun's men
3Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 49; Kiefer, Tausuq.
71-83.
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shelter, food, recruits, and information on the Japanese.4
Pendatun needed a victory to gain more local support 
and show his men that the Japanese could be defeated.
Because Fort Pikit in Cotabato Province was lightly 
garrisoned and distant from the main Japanese bases on the 
Lanao and Davao coasts, he chose it as the site for such a 
victory. If the guerrillas captured Fort Pikit, they would 
cut the only east-west road on Mindanao. Japanese loss of 
control of this road, Highway One, would mean that the their 
Cotabato Province garrison would be isolated from the bases 
at Davao and Cagayan. If such a main road were cut, the 
guerrillas and peasants in Cotabato Province would be safer. 
Japanese patrols would have to use trails to bypass 
roadblocks on Highway One the guerrillas could easily 
ambush. Since these Cotabato Moros would consider his 
actions brave, Pendatun realized that killing some Japanese 
would increase support from other Cotabato Province tribes 
even if he failed to capture Fort Pikit. If the Japanese 
killed many Moros, this would also elicit more family 
vengeance against the enemy.
The attack was a success. Thanks to peasant guides 
who led the guerrillas safely down secret trails, about 200 
guerrillas attacked the garrison in August 1942 and
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 540-41; Kuder, "The 
Philippines Never Surrendered," Saturday Evening Post. 17 
February 1945, 85; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 49; Robert 
Merchant, Lieutenant, U.S. Army, (ret.), letter to author, 2 
October 1989; Kiefer, Tausug, 60-65.
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overwhelmed it from many directions at once. Because the 
victory demonstrated Pendatun's power and encouraged the 
local peasants' desire to get revenge for the abuse they 
suffered, they joined him. Pendatun was tolerant of other 
cultures and he welcomed Filipino Catholics and Americans 
into his guerrilla force. His fame grew so large that 500 
Filipinos who fought Cotabato Province Moros before the war 
joined his force. Several unsurrendered American officers 
and enlisted men who lived in the jungle since May 1942 also 
joined Pendatun and contributed their staff and combat 
skills. Four Army Air Forces enlisted men who were 
experienced with infantry weapon maintenance, repaired 
machine guns and rifles. Other U.S. soldiers repaired 
vehicles. Lieutenant Colonel Frank McGee, U.S. Army, joined 
Pendatun as a subordinate. He was a very experienced 
infantry officer with combat experience in World War I and 
the Battle for Mindanao and helped Pendatun plan nis 
military operations.5
The Piang and Sinsuat clans were pre-war political 
rivals and both families remained hostile to each other 
during the Japanese occupation. Datu Sinsuat was the most 
important Japanese collaborator in the Cotabato Province. 
This situation turned the Piang family and their allies, who 
controlled the entire province, except the lower Cotabato
5Jack Samples, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, (ret.), 
letter to author, 30 September 1989; Merchant letter; 
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 540-41; Kiefer, Tausug, 
52-59, 121-34.
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River Valley and the west coast, against the Japanese. Many 
members of the Piang family decided to join or help the 
guerrillas in order to fight the Sinsuat Clan. After 
Pendatun received support from the Piang clan, most of the 
Moros in Cotabato Province supported Pendatun; so, he had 
greater security from enemy patrols and he had more recruits 
for his combat force.6
Pendatun's power reached its zenith when he expanded 
his control over Highway One in Central Mindanao in late
1942. This highway ran from Cotabato City to Davao City.
His men surprised the enemy at Kabacan and gave Pendatun 
control of the junction of the Sayre Road and Highway One, 
the best roads on Mindanao. Pendatun then overwhelmed five 
more small Japanese bases on Mindanao. These successes 
increased his stature and support. By January 1943, his 
force numbered 2,000 guerrillas, which made it almost as 
large as a U.S. regiment. He used his military training to 
set up a staff section to control this force.7
Pendatun prepared to assault his biggest objective, 
Malaybalay City in Bukidnon Province in January 1943.
Because he wanted to replenish his low ammunition stocks 
with captured enemy supplies, he decided to capture Japanese
6Dionisio Guterrez to General Basilio Valdez, 24 May
1943, HP, Box 42, UM; MacArthur to Fertig, 29 September 
1943, RG 16, MA; Ralph Thomas, "Muslim but Filipino: The 
Integration of Philippine Muslims 1917-1946," (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Pennsylvania, 1971), 258.
7Jesus Villamor, They Never Surrendered (Quezon City, 
Philippines: Vera-Reyes, 1982), 144.
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equipment at Malaybalay. Pendatun sent units of unknown 
strength to positions north and south of Malaybalay to 
ambush enemy troops who tried to rescue their comrades.
Since the route the enemy would use, the Sayre Road, was 
only 20 feet wide and overgrown, the guerrillas easily set 
up ambushes there.
From January to March 1943, Pendatun launched his 
attacks on Malaybalay with great determination and 
ingenuity. The enemy was well-armed with machine guns and 
other heavy weapons but the guerrillas temporarily overcame 
this with an amazing series of homemade weapons. The 
guerrillas took a 50-caliber machine gun from a crashed 
Japanese plane and used it to support the guerrilla assault. 
Guerrillas engaged Japanese-held buildings with dynamite and 
glass bombs wrapped in vines. They even salvaged bombs from 
a deserted U.S. airfield and catapulted them into Japanese 
lines. These weapons enabled Pendatun's men to surround the 
remainder of the garrison in a schoolhouse in the city's 
center by March 1943. However, superior Japanese firepower 
wore the guerrillas down so much that by the time they 
reached the schoolhouse they were too weak to capture it. 
Because the guerrillas assaulted the Japanese across streets 
that did not give them as much cover to surprise the enemy 
as the jungle, the guerrillas suffered more casualties. 
Pendatun's men used their makeshift weapons well, but 
replacement of casualties took time which the Japanese used 
to fortify their building and wait for reinforcements. By
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6 March, the guerrillas were so weak that 35 Japanese were 
able to break through guerrilla lines and reinforce the 
schoolhouse. Because it was obvious that his force would be 
subject to punishing enemy attacks if he remained, Pendatun 
retreated and consolidated his strength in Southern Bukidnon 
and Cotabato. Since the peasants considered Pendatun's 
attack brave, his popular support did not weaken.8
Police Lieutenant Colonel Claro Lauretta was another 
important guerrilla leader with an excellent background for 
resistance warfare in Davao Province. He was a graduate of 
the Philippine Military Academy where he learned basic 
leadership and combat skills. Lauretta also served with the 
Philippine Constabulary before the war. He gained valuable 
combat experience when he fought the Japanese during their 
invasion of Mindanao. Lauretta refused to surrender in May 
1942 and he gathered 2,000 Davao City refugees in the hills 
20 miles north of the city.
In the summer of 1942, Lauretta's refugee community 
faced the most potentially dangerous Japanese garrison on 
Mindanao. The enemy's airfields and port at Davao City were 
staging areas for Japanese offensives in the South and 
Southwest Pacific; so, it housed a 1,500-man garrison. 
Thousands of Japanese troops also passed through the port on
8Samples letter; Jonassen letter; Samuel Grashio, 
Colonel, U.S. Air Force, (ret.), letter to author, 18 June 
1989; Travis Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine (Garden City, 
New York; Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1945), 85-86.
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their way to the Southwest Pacific.
From May 1942 to June 1943, Lauretta established a 
very tight security arrangement to warn him of any Japanese 
operations; so, that his people could evacuate if danger 
became real. His 30 riflemen from a former police unit 
enforced law and order among the 2,000 peasants. Lauretta's 
men also repulsed Filipino bandit attacks. He used a series 
of outposts on every trail that led to the Japanese garrison 
which passed him information on the direction and location 
of enemy patrols that searched for guerrillas. This system 
made the Japanese easy to intercept and ambush before they 
reached the refugees. Lauretta's men treated strangers as 
if they were spies unless they quickly proved otherwise.
His men enhanced security when they restricted farming to 
areas nearby so that nobody could be captured and give away 
the guerrilla locations.9
Lauretta surrounded his villages with observation 
posts which alerted them to any danger. Because the peasant 
refugees joined his force as spies and riflemen, his small 
32-man force grew to 1,000 men. Lauretta ordered some of 
his men to infiltrate the Filipino stevedore group at the 
Davao port where Japanese ships were loaded. Since they 
worked in the center of the Japanese garrison, they gave him
9Rex Blow, Major, Australian Army, (ret.) letter to 
author, 1 September 1989; Mellnick, Philippine Diarv.
243-47; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 542; Grashio and 
Norling, Return to Freedom. 115.
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valuable information on enemy strength and plans. Because 
the jungle was so dense, Japanese troops patrolled trails 
and waterways. Guerrillas set up their ambushes along 
trails and bivouac sites where they could surprise Japanese 
patrols. Japanese troops usually did not have time to 
deploy and shoot their ambushers, so the guerrillas either 
chased them away or killed them. After an ambush, the 
Filipinos split up in different directions. If the Japanese 
survivors divided their patrol into small groups to capture 
the guerrillas, they would become disoriented and 
vulnerable. Lauretta's men gained such a fearsome 
reputation that Japanese prisoner-of-war camp guards at 
Davao were afraid to go deep into the jungle.10
Captain Louis Morgan, a Catholic Filipino guerrilla 
leader who was also half American and a police company 
commander built a guerrilla force from his company in Lanao 
Province. Morgan had served in the Lanao Province before 
the May 1942 surrender. After the surrender, he found other 
Filipinos and convinced them to join him. His 500 men spent 
most of their time protecting Filipinos near Kolambugan City 
from Moro bandit raids. Morgan massacred Moro villages 
instead of negotiating a solution through the local Datus, 
and so worsened Filipino-Moro relations. Due to his hatred 
of Moros, the guerrilla force was unable to form alliances
10Hawkins, Never Sav Die. 84-133; Grashio and Norling, 
Return to Freedom. 122; Blow letter; "Evacuee Report of 
Lieutenant Commander Melvin McCoy," RG 16, Box 45, MA.
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in the Moro-dominated province.
Lieutenant Colonel Wendell Fertig was another major 
guerrilla leader who gained a very important background for 
guerrilla warfare on Mindanao during his prewar civilian 
employment as an engineer in the Philippines. He had a 
Reserve Officer Training Corps commission earned at the 
Colorado School of Mines. Ke traveled throughout the 
islands for five years and he met many Filipinos. Fertig 
entered active service in the U.S. Army in June 1941 as an 
airfield construction inspector. He traveled all over the 
archipelago, including Mindanao. This experience gave him a 
relatively good insight to Filipino and Moro culture that 
someone who had not lived in the Philippines would not have 
had. Fertig realized that Filipinos and Moros valued 
personal rather than institutional loyalty. He observed how 
Catholic Filipinos reacted in various jobs at the mines in 
his reserve engineer unit and in his home. Fertig still 
felt somewhat condescending towards Filipinos. He believed 
that the moderate climate made them lazy and dependent on 
Americans for leadership.11
During the 1941-42 Philippine Campaign, Fertig served 
under Brigadier General Hugh Casey, MacArthur's chief 
engineer, on Luzon and Corregidor Island. Fertig flew from 
Corregidor to Mindanao in March 1942 during the fall of the 
Philippines. Since no space was left on the last plane that
11,,Evacuee Report by Wendell Fertig," RG 16, Box 44,
MA; "Evacuee Report of Ellwood Ofrett," RG 16, Box 44, MA.
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left for Australia, he remained on the island. He met a 
prewar friend, Captain Charles Hedges, U.S. Army, and they 
traveled around the island looking for a U.S. unit to join. 
After Fertig and Hedges heard of Wainwright's surrender at 
Corregidor and Sharp's surrender on Mindanao, they traveled 
on foot in Lanao Province and evaded Japanese patrols with 
the help of Filipinos and Moros who hid and fed them.
A combination of factors drove Fertig to organize a 
guerrilla force. He was grateful to the many peasants who 
risked their lives to take care of him, and he was angry 
that they were being treated so badly by the Japanese. He 
was furious at the Japanese who abused U.S. prisoners in a 
mock Fourth of July 1942 parade in Lanao Province. Police 
Captain William Tate, a Filipino who was half-American and a 
member of Morgan's guerrilla force, told Fertig that Morgan 
had organized 500 men into a guerrilla force. Fertig 
considered such a unit large enough to make guerrilla 
warfare feasible. Fertig also knew that Filipinos and Moros 
had been good guerrillas in the early years of the U.S. 
occupation from 1898 to 1911.12
Japanese troops were concentrated in coastal areas of 
Lanao and Misamis Occidental Provinces to defend ports that 
linked their shipping lanes to the Southwest Pacific.
Because these enemy garrisons did not have enough men to 
constantly patrol the island's interior, guerrillas like
12Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA; 
Keats, They Fought Alone. 36-103.
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Fertig lived in relative security. Large Japanese bases 
were in Lanao Province and smaller garrisons were kept at 
Zamboanga City and Misamis City. Japanese garrisons did not 
patrol more than a few miles from their cities. The Misamis 
City garrison only contained three Japanese who were 
probably recruiting Filipino policemen. Obviously, the 
Japanese did not consider this province very important. The 
Lanao Province garrison amounted to a total of 800 men. A 
number of Japanese occupied Zamboanga City but the rest of 
Zamboanga Province was free of Japanese.13
From July to September 1942, Fertig established his 
authority over Captain Morgan's men. Morgan had wanted 
Fertig to be the titular commander of his 500 men while 
Morgan secretly retained actual control. While he agreed to 
be Fertig's Chief of Staff, Morgan believed that he could 
get more Filipinos to join his guerrilla force by using 
Fertig's senior rank as a magnet. Because Fertig inspected 
Morgan's men and he demanded staff reports from Morgan and 
his assistants, Morgan's guerrillas learned to respect 
Fertig. Morgan's men saw Fertig, not Morgan, making policy; 
so, this action was a challenge to Morgan's power. Fertig 
knew about Morgan's violent past with the Moros and believed 
that all Morgan planned to do was fight Moros in Lanao 
Province instead of Japanese. Fertig was determined to gain
13|'Brief Tentative Report on Conditions in the Tenth 
Military District," 6 March 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA; Keats, 
They Fought Alone. 81-110; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 
335-67.
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control over Morgan's men. Fertig lied that he was a 
Brigadier General who was sent by MacArthur to lead a 
guerrilla movement. Since many Filipinos considered 
MacArthur a legendary figure due to his defense of 
Corregidor, Fertig's prestige rose. Morgan overestimated 
his strength in his following, and he did not pay attention 
to Fertig's growing power.
The opportunity for further expansion of guerrilla 
power came in September 1942. Japanese troops continued to 
remain in or near their garrisons in Lanao and Cagayan 
Provinces; so, they did not present an obstacle to the 
expansion of Fertig's force. Tate and 37 men sailed across 
Illigan Bay to Misamis Occidental Province and killed three 
Japanese policemen who probably were trying to organize a 
pro-Japanese police force. Because Fertig gained a larger 
peasant support base there, gaining Misamis Occidental 
Province was a very important event in the development of 
resistance strength. This extra area gave his organization 
more volunteers and food.14
From September 1942 to March 1943, Fertig set up a 
civil government in Eastern Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental 
Provinces to fulfill the people's basic needs. Fertig 
restored prewar mayors and province governors to their
14United States Forces in the Philippines, HQ Tenth 
Military District, Office of the Commanding Officer to the 
Commander in Chief SWPA, 28 September 1943, RG 16, Box 12, 
MA; Reverend Patrick O'Connor to Dr. O'Dwyer, 5 March 1943, 
St. Columban's Archives, Bellview, Nebraska; Keats, They 
Fought Alone. 91-103.
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previous positions. The civil government worked strenuously 
to assist areas which suffered from shortages in important 
crops to receive supplies of those crops from other areas 
with surpluses. The resistance established an elaborate 
supply system of trails, work animals, and laborers which 
kept the supplies moving. Fertig's civil government held 
prices to prewar levels that allowed the average peasant to 
buy enough rice or corn to feed his family. Since money 
gave Filipinos an alternative to barter, the Fertig's 
officials made this currency with crude printing presses to 
ease trade for the population. By March 1943, 
resistance-controlled areas functioned almost like they did 
before the war.15
Peasants and townspeople showed their gratitude by 
working for the resistance. Women rubbed brass against 
stone to make bullet cartridges while men enlisted in the 
combat units. Peasants distilled alcohol from coconut and 
tuba plants and made it into propulsion fuel for trucks and 
water launches. Bar girls, farmers, and stevedores near 
enemy garrisons in Lanao and Cagayan told the resistance 
what enemy activity they saw. Such volunteers were also an 
important replacement pool for casualties suffered in combat 
with the Japanese. As long as this popular support 
continued, the Japanese had to kill every Filipino in
15Jonassen letter; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 335-67.
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Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental Provinces if they were to 
destroy the resistance. Because Japanese resources were 
scattered all over the Far East and the Pacific fighting the 
British, Australians, Chinese, and the Americans, this was 
quite impossible. One peasant stated his lack of concern 
for Japanese attacks by uttering that even 4,000 Japanese 
could not find him among forty million trees. Because 
Mindanao was 94,600 square kilometers in area and covered 
with jungle, this peasant's statement was no mere boast.16
By May 1943, Fertig organized the combat arm of the 
resistance in the Western Zamboanga and Misamis Occidental 
Provinces. Fertig was determined, however, not to attack 
the Japanese garrisons. He spent from September 1942 to 
June 1943 preparing his men to defend against a Japanese 
offensive, and he established a peasant spy network that 
extended to the nearest Japanese garrisons in the Lanao and 
Misamis Oriental Provinces to warn him of a Japanese attack. 
He hoped to make radio contact with MacArthur in Australia 
and receive more weapons for even greater security. He 
established a complete staff to delegate his orders to the 
resistance. Fertig sent Morgan on an expedition around 
Zamboanga and Northern Mindanao to gather more volunteers. 
Because a military system had a complete chain of command
16Kuder, "The Philippines Never Surrendered," Saturday 
Evening Post. 17 February 1945, 86; Japanese Monograph No.
3, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two, December 
1942 to June 1944," U.S. Army Center of Military History, 
Washington, D.C. [hereafter CMH].
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for efficient transmission of orders, Fertig organized his 
3,747 men into squads, platoons, companies, battalions, and 
regiments. Fertig's men conducted their training with 
captured Japanese weapons. Since the men were not all
former soldiers and because sergeants and officers with
combat experience were rare, Fertig and his officers knew 
that the Filipinos would be best at ambushes and not in long 
battles. Because resistance warfare was based on 
squad-sized ambushes and rapid retreats to assembly areas, 
this fighting style would later avoid the high casualties of
company and battalion level combat in which his men were not
trained. According to a wartime Japanese document, the 
targets for Japanese "subjugative" operations for 1943 in 
the Philippines were resistance bases and radios. The 
Japanese garrison commander of Mindanao probably believed 
that such missions required months to find resistance 
targets and assemble enough force to launch them. This gave 
Fertig some time to organize his forces.17
Captain Charles Hedges, U.S. Army, Reserve, was 
another important guerrilla leader in Lanao Province who had 
a good background for organizing guerrilla warfare on 
Mindanao. He had several years of prewar service experience 
on the island during which he worked for a Lanao Province 
logging company. Hedges met many Moros and understood their
17Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA; 
Fertig to MacArthur, 25 October 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA; 
Japanese Monograph No. 3, "Philippine Operations Record, 
Phase Two, December 1942 to June 1944," CMH.
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strong loyalties to their local Datus. He also knew several 
important Moro leaders on Mindanao. Moros would respect 
Hedges' forceful personality.
During the fall of 1942, Moro resistance to the 
Japanese in Lanao was divided along clan lines and thus 
uncoordinated; so, Hedges faced a difficult task in uniting 
significant numbers of Moros. Moros responded to the 
Japanese murders and abuse of family members as well as 
intrusions on their land by forming guerrilla bands which 
ambushed enemy patrols. For example, when 129 Japanese 
troops fired on the Moro village of Tamparan in September 
1942, the Moros surrounded and killed 128 Japanese. The 
Moros destroyed another Japanese patrol in the same area. A 
Moro guerrilla band showed its fighting skill when it laid 
siege to the enemy's Ganassi Village garrison in Lanao.
They remained so close to the enemy lines that Japanese 
planes could not bomb or strafe them. Yet these scattered 
bands were based solely on village and family loyalties that 
also turned into feuds after ambushes were complete; so, the 
resistance was not long-lasting. Moro society was a web of 
alliances among different families which shifted constantly, 
and this kept the culture from destroying itself in civil 
war. They could have assumed that the Japanese would be too 
afraid to return after a successful Moro ambush; so, their 
old feuds became more important. Their hatred of Filipinos 
persisted and it complicated relationships between their 
guerrilla groups. Unifying Lanao required careful
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leadership to overcome these complex problems or the 
province resistance effort would be uncoordinated.18
Because Hedges established a good relationship with 
the Datus from September 1942 to May 1943, he accomplished 
unification despite the fact that he was an outsider. He 
placed members of feuding families as well as Moros and 
Catholics in separate guerrilla units in order to avoid 
internal fights. Hedges appointed Datus to command their 
respective followers to demonstrate his respect for their 
authority. Thomas Cabili, a prewar Lanao Province 
politician, and Edward Kuder, a former school teacher in 
Lanao, gave Hedges important advice concerning those Moro 
leaders who were trustworthy. Hedges demonstrated the type 
of showmanship Moros admired in a leader by keeping his 
headquarters within a few miles of a Japanese camp and by 
showing his skillful marksmanship. He helped set up 
effective civil government to meet Moro needs and security. 
His men arrested or killed bandits so that the civil 
government could be established and function smoothly.
Enemy foraging patrols caused a food shortage but the civil 
officials arranged for surplus food to ba redistributed from 
other provinces. The Moros reciprocated Hedges for these 
considerations by supplying his guerrillas with food, spies 
and recruits. The Moros were impressed with Hedges' 
understanding of their culture and his constant
18"Kuder Report," HP, Box 41, UM; Kiefer, Tausua.28-65.
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demonstrations that he was tough but fair. By May 1943, 
Hedges controlled almost 2,000 men.19
Major Robert Bowler, U.S. Army, was another pioneer 
guerrilla leader with a good understanding of Mindanao's 
cultures gained from a year of prewar service on the island. 
Bowler was a Regular Army officer and an instructor with the 
Filipino units before the war. He learned about the key 
trails, cities, local politicians, and Catholic Filipino and 
Moro soldiers who would later join his guerrilla force. 
During the battle for Mindanao he became a battalion 
commander who successfully led his men against the first 
enemy landings until his positions were outflanked.
Bowler's commander ordered him to take his battalion to the 
Bukidnon Province for a last stand. After traveling through 
the jungle for nearly a month, Bowler and his men learned of 
Wainwright's surrender. Bowler was determined not to 
surrender himself or his command, so he released his men to 
return to their homes. He faced considerable danger from 
Japanese patrols, so he constantly hid among friendly 
Filipinos. The Talakag Village peasants hid him and any 
other American who entered the village from many Japanese 
patrols. On one occasion, Bowler hid only 400 meters from a 
Japanese outpost. These experiences made him a tough but 
flexible-minded officer who knew how to lead men of a 
different nationality.
19Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 533-34; "Kuder 
Report," HP, Box 41, UM; Samples letter; Grashio letter.
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Japanese control of Bowler's area in the Misamis 
Oriental and Bukidnon Provinces was not very firm during the 
Autumn of 1942. Their main garrison which contained 275 men 
was at Cagayan in Misamis Oriental Province while a smaller 
unit of 190 troops was in the Bukidnon Province. They 
established smaller outposts nearby to collect food and 
taxes from the local population. Enemy troops needed the 
Sayre Road to reach Davao and Cotabato provinces, and they 
built outposts along this road to protect their truck 
convoys.
Bowler proved his courage and gratitude to the Talakag 
villagers. Unsurrendered Filipino soldiers and sergeants 
dug up hidden arms caches and found seventy men for Bowler. 
They asked Bowler to lead them in a guerrilla war. Bowler's 
seventy guerrillas drove the Japanese out of Talakag. After 
the battle, the Filipino policemen, whom the Japanese had 
tried to train, joined the guerrillas. In addition, the 
Talakag townspeople voted to make Bowler their leader. Due 
to his justifiable belief in the great danger of savage 
Japanese reprisals on civilians, Bowler was very reluctant 
to wage guerrilla warfare. If the Japanese considered 
Bowler's guerrillas a threat, they could have increased 
their inland patrols and killed more Filipinos. Because 
townspeople were so furious about the enemy atrocities and 
because they had confidence in Bowler, they were adamant 
about continuing to fight the Japanese. Therefore, he 
restricted guerrilla activities to small ambushes to satisfy
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their need for vengeance until he could contact U.S. forces. 
Because of the possibility of even small ambushes triggering 
more Japanese patrols, Bowler planned to disperse his 
guerrillas during such an enemy offensive. He believed his 
guerrillas' future mission in the war effort was 
intelligence gathering to assist returning U.S. forces.
Even if his ambushes provoked a Japanese offensive, Bowler's 
men could still collect information on the Japanese as long 
as they dispersed and at least one leader remained alive to 
analyze it.
Bowler's men established a good relationship with the 
peasants. They respected private property and reestablished 
a civil government. Bowler's guerrillas bought their 
supplies with their manufactured currency or goods. Patrols 
watched Japanese garrisons and warned the peasants of any 
approaching soldiers. Bowler restricted operations to small 
ambushes. After the Japanese left the area, peasants 
returned to their homes. Because Bowler restrained 
guerrilla activity so much that his men were not perceived 
as a threat by the Japanese, large Japanese patrols did not 
disrupt peasant life.20
Bowler and his men gained such a good reputation from 
their liberation of Talakag that more Filipinos joined him. 
Former soldiers and local peasants brought guns and 
ammunition with them to fight the Japanese. By October
20Bowler letter; Jonassen letter; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre, 52-60.
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1942, Bowler commanded at least 500 guerrillas who were fed 
by the local population in northern Bukidnon Province and 
Misamis Oriental Province.21
Major Ernest McClish, a Regular Army officer, was 
another early guerrilla leader in the Surigao and Agusan 
Provinces with extensive knowledge of the indigenous culture 
gained from long service in the Philippines. He honed his 
combat skills with the elite 57th Filipino Scout Regiment. 
When the U.S. Army gave McClish a training command with the 
81st Filipino Division, he gained further experience in 
working with Filipinos. He learned how to lead Filipinos 
with an effective combination of tact and decisiveness. 
McClish did not have an arrogant attitude towards Filipino 
culture which allowed him to be open-minded in his 
conversations with Filipinos. McClish's service as a 
battalion commander during the Japanese invasion of Mindanao 
gave him important combat experience. He refused to 
surrender and spent months dodging Japanese patrols.
McClish's experiences on Mindanao gave him the necessary 
understanding of the indigenous culture to communicate with 
the local population and the combat experience to lead men 
in battle.
McClish was appalled at the indigenous banditry and 
Japanese brutality after the May 1942 surrender. He was 
determined to protect the population with a guerrilla force.
21Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 41-65; Bowler Letter.
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Due to widespread banditry, he faced a serious challenge in 
organizing resistance in the Surigao and Agusan Provinces. 
Banditry threatened to stifle resistance to the Japanese.
The Japanese were naturally content with the situation and 
only maintained 160 men in Butuan City in Agusan Province 
and 120 in Surigao Province. Since Japan did not send food 
to her garrisons, the Japanese troops in Agusan and Surigao 
would continue to steal Filipino crops in the area if they 
were not stopped by guerrilla resistance.
McClish had a charismatic personality that quickly 
impressed local guerrilla leaders and earned their loyalty. 
He convinced two guerrilla leaders near Claveria village to 
come under his command and McClish gained 1,000 men. A 
Syrian mining engineer named Khalil Khador organized 900 mer. 
and joined him. McClish realized that harsher methods would 
be necessary to defeat bandits; so, he had one of his best 
officers organize a 200-man company for this task. They 
arrested or killed so many bandit leaders in late 1942 and 
early 1943 that McClish's power was solidified and peasant 
security increased. McClish's guerrillas recruited many 
bandits after the guerrillas arrested their leaders.
Because McClish's men were spread among the Agusan and 
Surigao villages, his supply system was very decentralized. 
If McClish gathered his 1,900-man force in one small area it 
would have eased supply problems but it also would have 
alarmed the Japanese. McClish's men were a serious threat 
to the Butuan garrison consisting of 300 Japanese troops.
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Unless the guerrillas remained scattered most of the time, 
they were vulnerable to counterattacks from Japanese troops 
from Davao and reinforcements that could have landed at 
Butuan to eliminate them. The guerrillas bought or traded 
for their food and clothing from the nearest villages. 
McClish's staff included supply personnel who found and 
distributed arms and ammunition that U.S. and Filipino 
soldiers buried before their surrender. Because they 
immediately issued whatever they received to the guerrillas, 
these men did not burden themselves with cumbersome records 
or storage facilities. This prevented surprise enemy raids 
from capturing their supplies and the staff was free to 
escape without trying to carry anything away.
Because McClish believed that killing Japanese was the 
best way to convince the local population that his 
guerrillas were not bandits who accepted peasant food and 
did nothing to protect them, he decided to attack the 
Japanese garrison at Butuan. Since the Japanese would be 
able to quickly reinforce Butuan by sea if they so desired, 
great dangers were involved in such an operation. McClish 
realized this and planned to send his 1,900 men against it 
from four sides and eliminate the Japanese before they could 
be reinforced. This was a reasonable estimate considering 
that only 300 Japanese opposed his forces. Clearing the 
garrison would also bring the guerrillas greater control of 
the Agusan River which could be used for more farming and 
increased transportation, unless the Japanese returned to
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Butaun. McClish also had to respect the understandable 
Filipino need for vengeance against the garrison which stole 
their crops and terrorized them. If he forgot or ignored 
the indigenous population's wishes, his popular support 
could have disappeared.
McClish's men launched a determined attack on Butuan, 
but they were not armed or trained for combat against 
fortified positions. The guerrillas assaulted the town in 
April 1943 from opposite sides and overwhelmed the outer 
defenses. The fighting was so fierce on the first day that 
most of the town was on fire. Because some guerrillas were 
not used to such constant fighting, they ran away. The 
Japanese withdrew into a brick schoolhouse and fortified it 
against a siege until their reinforcements arrived. The 
enemy used heavy fire from narrow gun ports to hold off the 
guerrilla assaults. McClishSs men lacked the mortars and 
machine guns with high rates of fire required to defeat the 
Japanese. Japanese reinforcements arrived with air support 
and on the ninth day they drove out the guerrillas.22
Because the local population considered the guerrilla 
attack brave, McClish still retained popular support. The 
Filipinos realized that McClish's men were willing to 
sacrifice themselves for their safety and not simply live 
off of their generosity in idleness. Such respect meant
22Clyde Childress, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, 
(ret.), letter to author, 17 November 1989; Grashio letter; 
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 537-39.
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more volunteers and food for McClish to strengthen his 
force. Guerrilla fortunes increased when the Butuan 
garrison totally evacuated the city. The Japanese 
evacuation was probably intended to consolidate their 
strength for a 1943 summer offensive in Western Mindanao to 
destroy Fertig's guerrillas, but the peasants considered the 
Japanese evacuation a guerrilla victory.23
There were two other significant guerrilla leaders. 
James Grinstead was a World War I veteran. Before the war, 
he trained Filipino policemen and hunted Moro and Catholic 
Filipino bandits on Mindanao. Grinstead later became a 
plantation manager. Because this background on Mindanao 
gave Grinstead the ability to know enough about Filipino 
culture to be fair to his men, he recruited a number of 
guerrillas in Bukidnon Province after the May 1942 
surrender. The other was Khalil Khador whose father had 
sent him to run his mines in the Agusan Province before the 
war. Khador was a tough man who used his powerful 
personality to intimidate 900 of his miners to join the
^Jonassen letter; Childress letter; Austin Shofner, 
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, (ret.), letter to 
author, 4 December 1989; Paul Marshall, Lieutenant Colonel, 
U.S. Army (ret.), phone call, October 1, 1989; Grashio 
letter; Fertig to MacArthur, 6 March 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA; 
United States Forces in the Philippines HQ, Tenth Military 
District in the Field to the Commanding General Southwest 
Pacific Forces, 6 March 1943, RG 16, Box l, MA; Willoughby, 
Guerrilla Resistance. 537-39; Hawkins, Never Sav Die. 
171-180; Ingham, Rendezvous. 63; Keats, They Fought Alone. 
221-24. The author could not find any Japanese documents on 
this withdrawal. McClish's organization did not suffer from 
a decrease in popular support, a sign that the Filipinos 
considered the result a guerrilla victory.
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guerrillas.24
Because the most important seven American and 
Mindanaoan leaders, except Morgan, understood the 
family-centered indigenous culture and they knew how to 
convince the population that organized guerrilla warfare was 
the best way to protect their families against the Japanese, 
they were able to organize resistance in their separate 
areas. When the guerrilla leaders killed Japanese patrols, 
warned villagers of their approach, and drove away bandits, 
they proved their worth to the local population. Filipinos 
and Moros repaid the resistance with food, shelter, 
recruits, and intelligence on Japanese activity.
24Jonassen letter; Robert Spielman, Captain, U.S.
Army, (ret.), telephone conversation, 20 June 1990; 
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 538.
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CHAPTER 3
ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE MINDANAO RESISTANCE
The Mindanao resistance had to become partisans under 
MacArthur if it was going to play a significant role in the 
Southwest Pacific Area. Once a clear chain of command 
stretched from MacArthur through one island commander to the 
individual resistance members, the guerrillas would become 
partisans. Fertig was determined to accomplish this.
Because Fertig believed that a unified resistance would give 
Mindanaoans the most power to fight their Japanese 
occupiers, he wanted to take control over all of the 
guerrilla groups. Guerrilla leaders who feared losing the 
authority they worked hard to attain, as well as other 
leaders who tried to usurp Fertig's authority over the 
island's resistance for greater personal power, made it 
difficult for Fertig to establish his control over the 
island. Because he was an American, Fertig faced potential 
indigenous resentment if he tried t-o attain control of 
Filipino and Moro guerrilla leaders. Due to Mindanao's 
rugged terrain, Fertig would be unable to meet and 
personally convince some of the independent guerrilla 
leaders to join him. Fertig had to convince these leaders 
that his command would help them kill more Japanese, and he 
had to neutralize his opposition without starting a civil
51
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war, if he was to unify resistance.
In February 1943, Fertig used a "home made" radio to 
contact MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area Headquarters 
(hereafter SWPA HQ) in Australia. In early 1943, SWPA HQ 
knew very little about any of the resistance groups in the 
Philippines. Because of the potential civil wars that could 
erupt on the islands over authority, SWPA HQ considered it 
imperative that it give the strongest leaders official 
authority. Because Fertig worked for Brigadier General Hugh 
Casey before and during the Philippine Campaign and since 
Casey was still MacArthur's chief engineer, Casey probably 
convinced MacArthur that Fertig was fit to command the 
Mindanao resistance. It is not clear if SWPA HQ knew that 
other commanders like Bowler and McClish were still alive. 
MacArthur gave Fertig official command of the Mindanao 
resistance in February 1943. In March, MacArthur sent four 
tons of supplies by submarine and an officer, Lieutenant 
Commander Charles Parsons, U.S. Naval Reserve, to confirm 
that Fertig was a good commander. Parsons had lived in the 
Philippines before the war, and he was an expert navigator. 
He was impressed with Fertig's civil government, guerrilla 
organization, and Filipino morale. Parsons also informed 
Fertig that more supplies would arrive.
Beginning in February 1943, General MacArthur*s 
headquarters exercised its authority over Fertig through the 
Allied Intelligence Bureau under Colonel Allison Ind, U.S. 
Army. The Allied Intelligence Bureau gathered information
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on the Japanese for Major General Charles Willoughby, U.S. 
Army, MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence. Ind maintained 
contact with the coastwatchers on New Guinea, New Britain 
and the Solomon Islands who reported Japanese sea and air 
movements to U.S. forces. The Allied Intelligence Bureau 
also sent small parties of agents into the Philippines to 
gather intelligence on the Japanese garrisons from embryonic 
guerrilla groups on each island, including Mindanao.
Because Fertig's intelligence on Japanese activities would 
allow MacArthur to make a more successful invasion of 
Mindanao, Ind considered the Mindanao guerrillas valuable.
If SWPA HQ were to supply and train the Mindanao guerrillas 
to become partisans, it would have a clearer picture of 
Japanese plans and dispositions.1
Despite SWPA HQ's location 700 miles away, it had an 
easy time bringing Fertig under its authority. When Fertig 
placed himself under MacArthur, Fertig achieved a crucial 
step towards commanding a partisan force. The first 
submarine shipment of supplies to Fertig included the latest 
radio equipment to make communications with Australia more 
reliable (and also make transmitters more vulnerable to 
enemy radio detectors). The most immediate benefits from 
coming under MacArthur's command were the supply of arms and 
medicine. The guerrillas needed more supplies to become
1Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 70-71; Allison Ind, 
Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War 
Acrainst Japan (New York: Van Rees, 1958), vii-viii, 48-57; 
James, Years of MacArthur. 2:319, 507.
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strong enough to defend themselves against future Japanese 
offensives while MacArthur*s men fought to return to the 
Philippines. In addition, Fertig knew that his guerrillas 
lacked the firepower and training to defeat the enemy 
garrisons without U.S. support. The defeats of the 
guerrillas at Malaybalay and Butuan illustrated these 
weaknesses.2
SWPA HQ ordered the Mindanao guerrillas to assist U.S. 
operations with an intelligence reporting system and not to 
attempt large-scale military operations (like Butuan and 
Malaybalay), which could trigger a strong Japanese 
counteroffensive out of reach of SWPA HQ direct assistance. 
MacArthur ordered the guerrillas only to fight to defend 
themselves. MacArthur planned to send instructions, radio 
equipment, rifles, sub-machine guns, ammunition, and 
medicine to give the guerrillas the necessary equipment to 
survive Japanese attacks and transmit information.3
Fertig had to unify his command before MacArthur's 
orders for him to set up an intelligence net could be 
implemented. If Fertig was to insure that coastwachers and 
radio operators were to be properly selected, monitored, and 
positioned, he had to establish a firm chain of command from 
himself down to the individual guerrillas. Furthermore,
2Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA; 
Fertig to Whitney, 24 January 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA.
3Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA; 
Bowler letter; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 526-28; 
Keats, They Fought Alone. 173-201.
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Fertig needed a supply network throughout the island if he 
was going to transport the radios, weapons, ammunition, and 
spare parts from the submarines. Fertig needed a unified 
command to insure that this equipment would be distributed 
properly and not stolen.
Due to a combination of reasons, Fertig had a 
relatively easy time establishing his authority over the 
American guerrilla leaders. Hedges, Bowler, and McClish 
came from a military culture that trained its men to respect 
the Jominian principle of unity of command. They believed 
that one man had to be in charge of tying an island's 
resistance forces together, or a chaos of conflicting 
directives would have resulted in the midst of a constant 
Japanese threat. Given their belief in unity of command, it 
is plausible to assume that MacArthur's appointment of 
Fertig to command the island solidified Bowler's, McClish's 
and Hedges's respect for Fertig. Because Fertig was a 
Lieutenant Colonel and, therefore, their superior in rank, 
Majors Bowler and McClish were also legally obligated as 
U.S. Army officers to place their guerrillas under him. 
Fertig's goal of establishing a unified resistance also 
impressed McClish on a personal level.4
The radios, guns, and propaganda material from
4Bowler letter; Merchant letter; Grashio letter; Blow 
letter; Jonassen letter; Samples letter; Childress letter; 
Fertig to Whitney, 17 January 1944, RG 16, Box l, MA;
Parsons to G-2, 10 August 1943, RG 16, Box 17, MA; Haggerty, 
Guerrilla Padre. 244-45.
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MacArthur's headquarters were also beneficial to Fertig's 
ability to establish his authority over guerrilla groups. 
Rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition gave the guerrillas 
more firepower for shorter and deadlier ambushes. Because 
the matchboxes with MacArthur's picture and American 
magazines reminded Filipinos and Moros that America was not 
defeated but actually winning the war against Japan, 
guerrilla morale improved. One American leaflet contained 
pictures of U.S. planes and ships along with the promise in 
Tagalog and English that America's vast resources would free 
the Philippines. News of the U.S. victories at Midway, 
Guadalcanal, and Tarawa convinced many Filipinos and Moros 
that American forces would return to Mindanao. Therefore, 
many Moros and Filipinos considered Fertig a valuable asset 
to help them fight the Japanese.5 Such outside aid was 
proof to many Filipinos and Moros that the U.S. was still in 
the war and could return to Mindanao. Therefore, they 
considered an alliance with U.S. officers on Mindanao 
realistic.6
Lauretta, the guerrilla leader of Davao Province, 
joined Fertig's command in early 1943 soon after hearing 
about it. McClish sent Lauretta a telegram sometime before
sBowler letter; MacArthur to Fertig, 15 August 1943,
RG 16, Box 29, MA; Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 
11, MA; "America Keeps Her Promises," pamphlet, n.p., circa 
1942 or 1943, author's collection.
6Grashio letter; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 
120-126; Keats, They Fought Alone. 193-97.
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April 1943 which stated his strength and that he would like 
to stay in regular contact with Lauretta. Since Lauretta 
thought his guerrillas would have greater security if they 
had such a powerful ally, he was excited about finding 
another guerrilla force to work with. Lauretta was 
pro-American and he proved so when he helped ten prisoners 
escape from Davao Prison Camp in April 1943. He also was 
not adverse to working with or for Americans. In July 1943 
Lauretta traveled to McClish's headquarters at Butuan, and 
he learned more about Fertig. Lauretta was in favor of an 
overall commander and he agreed to accept Fertig's order 
that his men be placed under McClish's command.7
The first serious challenge to Fertig's authority came 
from Salipada Pendatun, a successful guerrilla leader in 
Cotabato Province, who did not want Fertig to control him. 
Because Pendatun did not know Fertig personally or 
professionally, it was not clear to him what Fertig could 
accomplish; so, Pendatun refused to accept Fertig's 
authority over him. Furthermore, Pendatun was unsure of 
Fertig s motives and was afraid that Fertig would try to 
take away all of his power and influence in Cotabato.8
The existence of a large and independent regiment such 
as Pendatun's conflicted with unified resistance until
7Grashio letter; Mellnick, Philippine Diary. 244-45; 
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 99-100; Grashio and 
Norling, Return t.o Freedom. 115-30.
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 536; Keats, They Fought Alone. 173-90.
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Fertig could bring Pendatun's 2,000 men under control.
Fertig had to get this force to cooperate or face the 
possibility that Mindanao would have two leaders who would 
not work together. Two such power centers could have 
complicated guerrilla operations with violent disputes over 
areas of operation. If Fertig appeared too weak to control 
Pendatun, Fertig realized that Moros and Catholic Filipinos 
might lose confidence in Fertig's leadership and they might 
desert him. Fertig sent Pendatun messages that stated that 
he was the commander of all resistance on the island.
Fertig sent Parsons and Bowler to Cotabato Province to 
convince Pendatun to join his command. Parsons had been on 
Mindanao for about two months as MacArthur's supply 
coordinator and inspector. Parsons had a likeable 
personality; so, Fertig was confident that Parsons could 
tactfully bring Pendatun under control. The May 1943 
discussion between Pendatun and Parsons is not documented. 
Because Bowler befriended Pendatun before the war and Bowler 
was a valuable resource of information on Pendatun, Fertig 
chose Bowler to accompany Parsons.9 Bowler also 
demonstrated his skill in organizing resistance in Northern 
Bukidnon and it was clear to Fertig that Bowler knew how to
Witney to Chambers, 16 June, 1944, RG 16, Bex 16,
MA; Robert Bowler, Colonel, U.S. Army, (ret.), telephone 
conversation, 21 June 1990; Willoughby, Guerrilla 
Resistance. 93-97; Villamor, They Never Surrendered. 142-47; 
Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 81-87.
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influence the local population tactfully.10
Major Bowler played an important role in convincing 
Pendatun to recognize Fertig's authority. They were prewar 
friends, and this made communication easier between them.
As a Moro, Pendatun placed greater importance on personal 
loyalty to Bowler than to Fertig, a stranger. Pendatun1s 
attitude made it easier for Bowler to convince him that 
unity of command under Fertig would allow Pendatun's 
guerrillas to kill more Japanese and better protect his 
people.11
Due to a violent disagreement between Police Major 
Angeles Limena and Philippine Army Major Manuel Jaldon in 
Misamis Oriental Province early in 1943, Fertig faced a 
second and more serious obstacle to the unification of the 
resistance. Limena was so violently-tempered that in 
November 1942 he tried to execute a priest whom he had 
mistakenly considered a traitor.12 Jaldon had brothers who 
were pro-Japanese. Limena probably feared that Jaldon's 
brothers would influence him to collaborate with the 
Japanese; so, he attacked Jaldon's headquarters on 17 
February 1943. This created a condition for a potential
10Grashio letter; Pendatun to Parsons, 24 May 1943, RG 16, Box 13, MA.
11Pendatun to Parsons, 24 May 1943, RG 16, Box 13, MA; 
Bowler letter; Bowler telephone conversation.
12Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 58.
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civil war between each nan's unknown number of 
supporters.13 If Fertig arrested one or both, he could 
have faced an attack against his own headquarters from 
embittered followers of both leaders and their families. 
Fertig had to solve this problem quickly before an internal 
war broke out which the Japanese could exploit by secretly 
giving both factions arms to destroy each other.
Fertig restored peace when he transferred both men in 
April 1943. Since Limena was an officer in Bowler's 
battalion before the war and the two of them were good 
friends, Fertig sent Bowler to calm Limena down. Bowler 
gave Limena some supplies from the first submarine delivery. 
Limena's attacks against Jaldon ended within two weeks. To 
prevent future battles between their followers, Fertig then 
transferred each man to different provinces. Both received 
the same treatment, presumably to offend neither. With 
Jaldon and Limena both gone, there was no more fighting 
between their men. Fertig gave Jaldon another command in 
the Zamboanga Province. It is not clear whether Jaldon's 
pro-Japanese brothers influenced him or if he was angry at 
being transferred but he deserted to the Japanese sometime 
about July 1943. This incident threw his regiment into 
disarray until December 1943 when new leadership arrived. 
Limena served under Hedges in Lanao without any apparent
13Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 87-97.
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problems.14
The third and greatest challenge to Fertig's authority 
was Morgan, Fertig's Chief of Staff. Morgan believed he was 
betrayed by Fertig when in June 1943 Fertig chose Bowler to 
be Fertig's second in command.15 Because Morgan provided 
Fertig with his first guerrillas and territory, Morgan 
thought he was the more deserving officer. Morgan did not 
have any respect for Fertig, and he planned to control the 
resistance secretly. Consequently, he refused to accept 
Fertig's judgment in making another man his second in 
command. Morgan also resented what he saw as Fertig's 
racism toward the Filipinos. He stated that Fertig issued 
better equipment to American enlisted men than were issued 
to Filipino officers. Morgan also accused Fertig of only 
promoting Americans and placing them in key positions.16
Since the U.S. officers were part of the same military 
culture, they were easier for Fertig to control. Because 
the army that the guerrillas would support was American, 
American officers were the best men to make the indigenous
14Bowler letter; Royce Wendover, "War Diary 7 December 
1941 to 5 December 5 1945," 225-51, WP, CBy Worchester to 
Fertig, 16 October 1943, HP, Box 43, UM; Willoughby, 
Guerrilla Resistance. 87-52; Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre. 
93-94.
15Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 540-41; Pendatun 
to Parsons, 24 May 1943, RG 16, Box 31, MA; Iliff 
Richardson, Lieutenant, U.S. Navy (ret.), letter to author,
7 November 1989.
16Fertig to MacArthur, 28 September 1943, RG 16, Box 
12, MA; Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare. 118-21.
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partisans conform to U.S. missions. Fertig appointed 
Americans who were deeply involved in a certain province's 
resistance effort.
Morgan tried to incite the Filipinos and Moros against 
Fertig, and he became a serious threat to the unity Fertig 
had developed. Morgan sent a series of demands and threats 
to Fertig. He provided copies to his loyal 80 supporters 
and neutral Moro leaders to try to prove his power. He 
promoted himself to "Commander of the Resistance on 
Mindanao, the Dutch East Indies, and the British East 
Indies."17
Fertig realized that if he executed or imprisoned 
Morgan, either action would have radicalized Morgan's 80 men 
and other sympathizers. If Fertig did not exercise 
restraint in dealing with Morgan, Morgan's guerrillas would 
have become potential enemies. Because Morgan's men knew 
where to find and kill Fertig and other key leaders, they 
could be more dangerous than the Japanese soldiers. Should 
Morgan launch any attacks against him, Fertig planned to 
lure the Japanese into an attack on Morgan on the Lanao 
Province coast while Captain Hedges' Moros were to attack 
from inland.
17Morgan to the Dutch and British East Indies, 4 July 
1943, RG 16, Box 12, MA; Hailbrunn, Partisan Warfare.
118-21; Keats, They Fought Alone. 329. The author found no 
documentation that mentioned any other indigenous leaders 
who leveled the charge of racism against Fertig. Fertig's 
diary, which is owned by his daughter in Golden, Colorado, 
was unavailable to the author. Without an examination of 
this diary, any discussion of his "racism" is speculative.
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Since Morgan's attempts to broaden his support failed, 
Fertig's patience was justified. Fertig*s power was 
relatively secure after Pendatun joined him in May 1943. 
Because the Datus knew that Fertig, not Morgan, had the guns 
and authority from MacArthur, Morgan failed to gain Moro 
support. These Moro leaders saw Fertig as the best way to 
get more guns to kill Japanese, who were the immediate 
threat. Additionally, one Datu whom Morgan tried to enlist 
claimed that Morgan had murdered some of his relatives 
during Mindanao's fall in 1942. This Datu along with others
believed that Morgan still hated Moros and that he merely
wanted to use them to crush Fertig. When MacArthur awarded 
Fertig a Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest 
U.S. medal, in August 1943, Fertig's prestige rose. From a 
Moro's perspective, Fertig then had a more assured access to
American weapons which the Koros needed to protect their
people from the enemy.18
Because Fertig wanted to avoid violence with Morgan, 
Fertig wanted to put him on the next supply submarine from 
Australia. He asked Morgan to leave for Australia so that 
he could train Filipinos for their return to Mindanao.
First Lieutenant Samuel Grashio, United States Army Air 
Forces, an escaped prisoner-of-war, established a good 
relationship with Morgan and reinforced Fertig's proposal by
18Morgan to Fertig, 4 August 1943, RG 16, Box 12, MA; 
Fertig to MacArthur, 10 August 1943, RG 16, Box 17, MA; 
Keats, They Fought Alone. 55.
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persuading Morgan that he had to tell his own story at 
MacArthur's headquarters if he were to receive any credit 
for what he did on Mindanao to oppose the Japanese. Morgan 
probably knew by this point that his attempt to usurp 
Fertig's authority was a failure, but this advice gave him 
an honorable way to accept defeat, and he left by submarine. 
Morgan was obviously a broken man when he left Mindanao. He 
attended a combat course at the Fraser Commando School. His 
activities after that are unknown.19
Small guerrilla bands that formed in southern 
Zamboanga after the May 1942 surrender remained independent 
of Fertig's command until December 1943. The separate 
guerrilla groups which formed in 1942 to protect Filipino 
refugees from enemy troops did not cooperate with the 
commanders the former Philippine Army Lieutenant Colonel 
Hipolito Garma, the Zamboanga Province Commander, sent from 
the province headquarters in Northeastern Zamboanga. Garma 
did not adequately supervise bad commanders like Jaldon. 
Therefore, Garma was unable to unify these smaller guerrilla 
units. First Lieutenant Donald LeCouver, U.S. Army Air 
Forces, assumed command of the guerrillas in Southern 
Zamboanga in December 1943 and finally unified the separate 
groups. He brought his battalion-sized command under
19Grashio letter; Fertig to MacArthur, September 1943, 
RG 16, Box 17, MA; "Fraser Commando School Passing Out 
Report, L.P. Morgan," 16 April 1944, RG 16, Box 12, MA; 
Keats, They Fought Alone. 256-94, 285-300; Grashio and 
Norling, Return to Freedom. 133-35.
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Fertig's control.20
By demanding reports made by courier or radio on unit 
strength and activities, Fertig maintained control over the 
six province commanders. With the serious organizational 
obstacles removed, Fertig established his command structure 
that covered most of Mindanao by September 1943. Hedges 
commanded Lanao Province, McClish led Surigao, Agusan and 
Davao Provinces, McGee led Cotabato Province, Garma 
commanded the northeastern Zamboanga Province and Misamis 
Occidental Province, and Bowler was in charge of Bukidnon. 
Fertig made these commanders send reports not only for 
information, but also to remind his subordinates that he was 
their commander. It would have been impossible for Fertig 
to travel throughout the island to personally supervise his 
commanders when travel between adjacent provinces lasted 
weeks and fulfill his missions as the overall commander. 
Fertig used the reports as a substitute for personal travel 
and to evaluate the performance of his commanders. He also 
sent orders to correct problems he saw in the reports. 
Because this method of control was very common in the army 
Fertig and his commanders were trained in, it was generally 
accepted.21
20Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 87-88; McGee, Rice 
and Salt. 166-75. McGee has the only information on 
LeCouver's early days as a guerrilla leader but he does not 
explain how LeCouver unified his command.
21Spielman, "114th Infantry Regiment," 23; Jonassen 
letter.
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The local civil government was a key factor in 
establishing Fertig's authority over the island and in 
achieving unity of command. Due to the fact that the 
resistance civil government kept many Filipinos and Moros as 
satisfied as they could have been under the circumstances, 
Fertig's province commanders found it easier to implement 
military directives. It was better for Fertig's 
headquarters to disseminate anti-Japanese propaganda through 
civilian leaders who insured wider distribution.22
The unity Fertig established transformed the Mindanao 
guerrillas into partisans. If the partisans were to 
construct a proper intelligence net, SWPA HQ needed one 
commander on Mindanao. Since the most powerful guerrilla 
leaders shared his goal of a unified resistance, Fertig 
achieved this unity. By using good negotiators, he overcame 
two serious challenges to his authority. By allowing a 
rebel to realize his own weakness and leave the island, 
Fertig prevented a civil war within the resistance.
22Jonassen letter; Grashio letter; Willoughby,
Guerrilla Resistance. 333-67; Spielman, "114th Infantry 
Regiment," 62.
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CHAPTER 4 
PARRYING JAPANESE ATTACKS
Throughout 1943 and 1944, Fertig and his province 
commanders faced the danger of Japanese offensives. The 
partisans were not equipped to defeat the Japanese by 
destroying them; so, the partisans had to develop a strategy 
that would preserve their own strength. If Fertig and his 
officers did not, the Japanese had the firepower to destroy 
partisan radio stations and units. Such a result would have 
forced Fertig or his successor to waste time rebuilding the 
resistance organization.
Fertig's communications with SWPA HQ concerning 
partisan missions and submarine rendezvous also made the 
resistance a target for Japanese offensives. The Japanese 
pinpointed his headquarters with radio direction finders. 
Since the guerrillas coordinated rendezvous points by radio 
for submarine supply shipments of guns, ammunition, and 
radios, the Japanese had good reasons to want to destroy the 
partisan radios. Mindanao was the closest Philippine Island 
to MacArthur's northwesterly path from New Guinea and the 
Japanese feared that MacArthur would try to seize Mindanao 
and use its large port at Davao and the airfields at Del 
Monte as staging areas for reconquering the rest of the 
Philippines. The eneay must have realized that U.S.
67
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supplies also increased the chances of the partisans 
becoming a combat as well as a security threat which would 
assist a U.S. invasion force with information on Japanese 
garrisons and harass Japanese movements. Therefore, the 
Japanese assembled a 3,000 man force to strike Misamis 
Occidental Province, where Fertig's headquarters was, in 
June 1943 and attempt to eliminate the partisan radio 
traffic with SWPA HQ.1
Fertig realized that his men were not trained or 
equipped to defend territory against a Japanese offensive, 
and he employed a defensive theory to prevent the enemy from 
surrounding and destroying his command. The resistance 
established mutually supporting ambush positions to pin down 
any Japanese unit smaller than a battalion while other 
partisan ambushers launched flanking or rear attacks on it 
to inflict maximum casualties. He ordered that the 
partisans not engage any enemy units of battalion size or 
larger. Fertig anticipated that the rapid partisan 
withdrawals along jungle paths which only Filipinos knew 
would frustrate Japanese efforts to engage and destroy them. 
Fertig expected that Japanese terrorism in the lost areas 
would preserve peasant support for the partisans. He 
thought that the enemy's frustration over failing to destroy 
the resistance would force the Japanese to halt their
1Grashio letter; Japanese Monograph No. 3, "Philippine 
Operations Record, Phase Two, December 1942 to June 1944," 
CMH; Keats, They Fought Alone. 227-94.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
offensive and withdraw their troops. After the Japanese 
retreated, the partisans would return and reestablish the 
civil government in former Japanese-held areas.2
The flaw in Fertig’s defense plan was the location of 
his headquarters in a province, Misamis Occidental, that was 
easy for the enemy to isolate from the bulk of his forces. 
The Japanese had to control only a seven-mile wide isthmus 
between the Pagadian and Panguil Bays and the surrounding 
coastal waters to cut Fertig off from the bulk of Mindanao. 
Even after several Japanese reconnaissance flights flew over 
Fertig's headquarters at Misamis City, he did not move his 
command post. His headquarters was too close to the coast, 
and it was vulnerable to a Japanese amphibious commando 
raid. He could have moved to the much safer eastern part of 
Mindanao where his escape into the mountainous jungle was 
easier, but he did not.3
The Japanese began their first major offensive on 
26 June 1943 and they landed simultaneously at Clarin in 
Misamis Occidental province just north of Misamis City and 
at Tucuran on the other side of the isthmus in the adjacent
2Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA; 
Fertig to Commanding General SWPA Forces, 6 March 1943, RG 
16, Box 1, MA; Keats, They Fought Alone. 170; Mao, On 
Guerrilla War. 46.
3Station WYZB to MacArthur, 27 June 1943, RG 16, Box
29, MA; Worchester to Fertig, 16 October 1943, HP, Box 42, 
UM.
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Zamboanga Province.4 According to Fertig's estimates and a 
Japanese wartime document, 3,000 Japanese troops attacked in 
a pincer movement to prevent Fertig's escape into Eastern 
Mindanao and to destroy his organization. Eight aircraft 
and one destroyer supported the landings.5 The well-armed 
Japanese faced only several hundred armed partisans near the 
Japanese landing areas.6 Because the partisans lacked 
coastal artillery and antiaircraft guns to fight back 
effectively, the ship and planes panicked many guerrillas. 
Filipinos were not armed or trained to hold their ground 
against such heavy firepower; so, most of them deserted 
their positions. If the partisans had not done this, the 
Japanese would have surrounded and annihilated the Misamis 
Occidental Province resistance.
Fertig tried to control this unexpected partisan mass 
escape, but he found it impossible. Panicked partisans gave 
Fertig reports which confused him. Because the general 
panic halted radio communications, Fertig was rarely 
informed of the situation. Fertig loaded his truck with 
supplies and tried to reassemble the command, but he could 
not contact his commanders. He kept his SWPA codes and
Dorchester to Fertig, 16 October 1943, HP, Box 42,
UM; Keats, They Fought Alone. 223.
sFertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA; 
Japanese Monograph No. 3, "Philippine Operations Record, 
Phase Two, December 1942 to June 1944," CMH; Wolfert, 
American Guerrilla. 104-15.
6"Local News," RG 16, Box 12, MA; Worchester to 
Fertig, 16 October 1943, HP, Box 42, UM.
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partisan files in a suitcase and fled into the jungle.
Fertig dodged Japanese patrols in Misamis Occidental for a 
week. Finally, Captain Hedges and a Moro company rescued 
him, and they took him to Lanao by boat.7
The Japanese incorrectly assumed that the resistance 
was destroyed and that all that needed to be done was to 
hunt down individual partisans or small partisan bands; so, 
they split their 3,000-man force into smaller units. Their 
goal was to find and kill as many partisans as possible and 
eliminate the leadership. The smaller patrols allowed the 
Japanese commanders to search larger areas of Misamis 
Occidental province in less time, but they lacked the 
strength to defend themselves or to assist each other. The 
enemy sweep against the resistance forces was like hundreds 
of weak fingers searching through a hornet's nest. This 
weakness allowed first pairs and then hundreds of Filipinos 
to reassemble and eliminate some weak and isolated Japanese 
patrols.8
The enemy over-reacted to this partisan resurgence by 
forming much larger-sized patrols in an attempt to defeat 
the partisan platoons or companies. These enemy patrols 
grew in size to battalions which made a lot of noise while 
they struggled through the jungle. The Japanese needed more
7"Kuder Report," HP, Box 41, UM; Keats, They Fought 
Alone. 229-44; Wolfert, American Guerrilla. 108-9.
8Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 11, MA;
Keats, They Fought Alone. 258-69; Wolfert, American 
Guerrilla. 108.
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nobility and information to catch the Filipinos who knew the 
local trails well. Because of their heavy equipment and 
their reliance on maps, the Japanese patrols moved slowly 
through the jungle. The enemy controlled an area only as 
long as they were actually in it. The resistance reoccupied 
the same area after the Japanese left it.9
By October 1943, the enemy withdrew to the coastal 
villages of Misamis Occidental Province. Their extreme 
shifts from small to large patrols without good information 
on partisan locations made it almost impossible for them to 
eliminate Fertig's forces. These operations were a drain on 
enemy manpower given the fact that the Japanese were 
fighting KacArthur in New Guinea and Admiral Chester Nimitz, 
U.S. Navy, in the Central Pacific. Some Japanese left 
Misamis Occidental Province and went to other combat zones 
in the Pacific. These withdrawals left Japanese units in 
the interior too weak to control their areas; so, the 
Japanese retreated to and fortified Misamis City. According 
to Fertig's 9 August 1943 estimates of Japanese casualties, 
they suffered 152 dead and 52 wounded from partisan ambushes 
since the offensive started in June 1943.10
The partisans retained popular support despite the 
fact that the Japanese temporarily pushed them out of the
9Fertig to Casey, 1 July 1943, RG 16, Box 29, MA;
Keats, They Fought Alone. 250-58.
10Station WYZB to Fertig, 7 August 1943; Fertig to 
MacArthur, 9 August 1943; Fertig to MacArthur, 9 August 
1943, RG 16, Box 29, MA.
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province. The Japanese did not destroy the partisan 
infrastructure among the townspeople and villagers, and the 
resistance easily reestablished its authority over the 
indigenous population by reinserting its leaders into the 
villages where they spread American propaganda. Japanese 
troops did not remain deep inside the province long enough 
to even attempt to gain popular support. Because the 
partisans depended on peasants for food, shelter, recruits, 
and information, their relationship with the peasants was 
essential for partisan survival.11
SWPA HQ needed a special staff to help the partisans 
survive future Japanese offensives and assist the partisans 
in developing their intelligence system. SWPA HQ therefore 
in July 1943 established the Philippine Regional Subsection 
in MacArthur's headquarters under Colonel Courtney Whitney, 
U.S. Army. He took the responsibility for directing 
Fertig's combat and intelligence missions from Colonel Ind's 
Allied Intelligence Bureau. Whitney was responsible for 
recognizing the authority of resistance leaders who were 
pro-American as well as supplying them with guns to defend 
themselves and radios to report enemy information. The 
Philippine Regional Subsection gathered information on 
Japanese strength and activities from resistance groups all 
over the archipelago, including Mindanao. Whitney reported
11Station WYZB to Fertig, 9 August 1943, RG 16, Box 
29, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 7 August 1943, RG 16, Box 29, 
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 25 October 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA; 
Keats, They Fought Alone. 250-58.
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the intelligence to Lieutenant General Willoughby,
MacArthur's chief intelligence officer. The Philippine 
Regional Subsection had access to Japanese documents that 
were translated by Ind's staff. Colonel Sydney Mashbir,
U.S. Army, and his Allied Translator and Interpreter Service 
also gave Whitney translated Japanese documents. These 
documents gave Whitney a good view of Japanese strength and 
its colonial administration. The advantage of dedicating 
such a group to the Philippines was that Whitney's staff 
became specialists on this prospective battleground and 
would be better able to instruct the partisans on their 
intelligence missions.12
Whitney's primary concern was that Fertig's partisans 
survive Japanese offensives in order to build an 
intelligence network. In December 1943, Whitney was 
concerned that Fertig had planned a static defense of his 
new headquarters at Esperanza City in Northern Agusan 
Province. Whitney was afraid that increased submarine 
supply shipments of cannons and heavy machine guns, would 
convince Fertig that he had enough firepower to hold his 
ground against a Japanese offensive and thus run the risk of 
being destroyed. Whitney telegrammed Fertig that a mobile 
and dispersed defense would probably convince the Japanese 
that the partisans were a small threat, and the Japanese
12Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 119-80; James,
Years of MacArthur. 2:506-11.
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would not attack the partisans.13 Whitney supplemented his 
message by an order to Fertig not to distribute heavy 
weapons to the partisans until an actual U.S. landing on 
Mindanao. SWPA Headquarters feared that such weapons would 
force the enemy into wiping out the resistance before a U.S. 
landing and would increase Japanese abuse of the 
population.14
The radio transmissions threatened the partisans' 
existence for about a year before MacArthur's troops 
returned to Mindanao; so, Fertig issued the heavy weapons to 
his men and established a subcommand to take over the 
resistance if he were killed. Fertig issued the machine 
guns and he limited his attacks to ambushes in an effort to 
convince the Japanese that his partisans were not a combat 
threat to their garrisons. The partisans were in jeopardy 
while they reported intelligence; so, they needed the 
machine guns and cannons to increase their firepower to gain 
time to relocate their communications equipment in case of 
an enemy attack.15 In January 1944 Fertig set up a 
sub-command in Western Mindanao called "A Corps" under 
Bowler to allow the resistance to continue on its missions 
if Fertig's headquarters was destroyed. Fertig gave him
13Whitney to Fertig, 3 November 1943, RG 16, Box 17,MA.
14Keats, They Fought Alone. 331-32. Keats prints this 
document in his book.
15Fertig to Whitney, 17 January 1944, RG 16, Box 1,
MA; Keats, They Foucrht Alone. 334-38.
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command of the forces in Zamboanga, Misamis Occidental, 
Misamis Oriental, Lanao, Bukidnon, and Cotabato so that 
these partisans would have an overall commander close by to 
coordinate submarine rendezvous, supply distribution and 
partisan missions.16
After having failed to destroy Fertig's force in 
Misamis Occidental Province in 1943, the Japanese remained 
very concerned about Fertig's radio transmissions to 
Australia. Due to the many radio transmissions that passed 
from all provinces to Fertig as well as Fertig's messages to 
Australia, the Japanese once again located Fertig's 
headquarters with radio direction finders. The Japanese 
were also aware of some of the submarine shipments to the 
partisans. Unless the Japanese were to smash the resistance 
soon, the partisan radio reports would give away the 
Japanese defense plans that would help MacArthur's planners 
send enough troops to crush them.17
The 1944 Japanese offensive's main effort was 
concentrated on Fertig's command post in Esperanza City in 
the Agusan Province. According to Fertig's estimates, the
16Bowler letter; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 535-36.
17Allied Translator and Interpreter Section Document 
No. 601006; Allied Translator and Interpreter Section 
Document No. 600615, RG 3, Box 146, MA; Allied Translator 
and Interpreter Section Document No. 600420; Allied 
Translator and Interpreter Section Document, "Guerrilla 
Warfare in the Philippines," RG 3, Box 145, MA. The author 
could not find any sources that describe the schedule and 
the specific content of each submarine shipment.
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Japanese seized the mouth of the Agusan River in March 1944 
with a 200-man landing force drawn from Misamis Oriental 
Province. They supplemented this attack by landing what 
Fertig estimated to be 1,500 troops at Lianga in Surigao 
Province. The enemy intended to smash the partisans with 
these simultaneous attacks and encircle as many of the 
resistance forces as possible.18 The Japanese forces that 
drove southward along the Agusan River were reinforced to
1.000 men and those in Surigao were eventually increased to
3.000 men in June 1944; so, they drove Fertig's 5,403 men 
southward along the Agusan River.19
Skillful partisan defenses gave most of Fertig's force 
time to evacuate; so, the Japanese pincer attacks never 
surrounded the partisans. For example, one partisan unit 
used some 37-millimeter cannons to stall the Japanese 
advance. These partisans were fortunate enough to have 
canister rounds which each sprayed 122 steel balls fired 
from concealed positions. Some partisans ambushed Japanese 
deep inside their own lines. For example, one patrol killed 
53 enemy who had assembled for a briefing. McClish, the 
commander of the guerrilla forces in Agusan and Surigao
"Philippine Regional Subsection to Chief of Staff 
SWPA, 21 March 1944, RG 16, Box 13, MA; Jonassen letter.
19Fertig to MacArthur, 20 June 1944, RG 16, Box 31,
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 26 June 1944, RG 16, Box 58, MA; 
Whitney to Chief of Staff SWPA, 6 July 1944, RG 16, Box 58, 
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 7 July 1944, RG 16, Box 58, MA; 
Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 539. The author could not 
find any Japanese estimates for their troop strength in this 
offensive against Fertig's headquarters.
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Provinces, proved to be a good tactician who insured that 
his men retreated before they were overwhelmed. Such 
performance and dedication bought Fertig enough time to move 
his headquarters several times during the Japanese offensive 
without losing communications with SWPA HQ in Australia. No 
partisan casualty figures were available for this sector of 
the Japanese offensive.20
The intelligence network of Lieutenant Colonel Clyde 
Childress, U.S. Army, played a vital role in helping to 
relieve pressure on the Agusan and Surigao resistance 
forces. SWPA HQ gave Fertig the authority to promote 
Childress from Major to Lieutenant Colonel. His 
organization gave Fertig detailed information on enemy 
activities near the Davao Naval Base where more than 20,000 
Japanese troops concentrated on fortifying the Davao port 
against a U.S. landing. This information allowed McClish to 
concentrate most of his men to oppose attacks from Northern 
Agusan and Surigao without using manpower unnecessarily to 
prepare defense against attacks from Davao. Most 
importantly, Childress's spies sent SWPA HQ by submarine 
photographs of Davao with ships, buildings, and air defense 
installations plotted on them, which made the August and 
September 1944 Army Air Forces and Navy air attacks
20Whitney to Chief of Staff, SWPA, 9 July 1944, RG 16, 
Box 58, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 12 July 1944, RG 16, Box 
58, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 16 July 1944, RG 16, Box 58,
MA; Jonassen letter; Whitney to Chief of Staff, SWPA, 18 
July 1944, RG 16, BOX 58, MA.
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effective. For example, on one raid, B-24 bombers from a 
New Guinea airbases destroyed 34 planes before they were 
airborne and killed 100 Japanese. Because the U.S. attacks 
were so destructive, the Japanese became convinced that U.S. 
landings were imminent. They halted their major 
antipartisan sweeps and in September 1944 began to prepare 
for the expected U.S. landings.21
The Japanese battalion offensives in April and May 
1944 in Bowler's provinces also failed to eradicate the 
resistance. These attacks were uncoordinated. By laying 
ambushes that bought enough time for their escape, Bowler's 
men learned to evade these attacks without suffering many 
casualties. The partisan ambushers also struck the enemy 
when they returned to their bases. The resistance was so 
good at preserving its strength that the Japanese only 
killed 260 partisans in the A Corps area.22
Despite the large Japanese patrols, Bowler's men
21Chiiaress letter; Fertig to MacArthur, 28 July 1944, 
RG 16, Box 58, MA; Whitney to Chief of Staff, SWPA, 5 August 
1944, RG 16, Box 58, MA; Davao Gulf Evacuee Report, RG 16, 
Box 44, MA; Whitney, Guerrilla Resistance. 543; M. Hamlin 
Cannon, Levte: The Return to the Philippines. 2d ed., U.S. 
Army in World War Two Series (Washington, D.C.: Center of 
Military History, Department of the Army, 1987), 42.
22Samples letter; MacArthur to Fertig, Cushing,
Abcede, and Peralta, 19 October 1944, RG 16, Box 5, MA; 
Allied Translator and Interpreter Section Document No. 
601006, RG 3, Box 146, MA; Allied Translator and Interpreter 
Section Document No. 600615, RG 3, Box 146, MA; Allied 
Translator and Interpreter Section Document No. 60042, RG 3, 
Box 145, MA; Allied Translator and Interpreter Section 
Report, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," RG 3, Box 
145, MA; Spielman, "History of the 114th Regiment," 28.
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launched damaging raids along the Sayre Road. The partisans 
launched ambushes and commando raids on enemy troops and 
vehicles on bridges that carried the road. The partisans 
burned some bridges that spanned rivers and gorges; so, the 
Japanese were forced to rebuild them. Partisan ambushers 
usually set up their attacks where the road crossed a hill 
where Japanese vehicles had to slow down, making the 
occupants vulnerable to partisan fire. If a Japanese convoy 
contained more than four vehicles, the average ambush patrol 
fled; so, that the partisans would not be overwhelmed. 
Lieutenant Colonel James Grinstead, who was promoted by 
Fertig and was the Bukidnon Province commander, and his 
partisans killed 68 Japanese troops and destroyed 31 trucks 
in only 11 ambushes. Because the Sayre Road was the fastest 
route for the Japanese to shift forces to oppose prospective 
landing sites at Davao, Cagayan, and Malabang, the road's 
security became more important to the Japanese as MacArthur 
came closer to the Philippines. Because of th-e damaging 
partisan attacks, the Japanese reinforced their road 
garrison to Fertig's estimate of 1,000 men by May 1944.
These men could have attacked partisan areas but instead, 
they were on the defensive.23
^Jonassen letter; Merchant letter; Fertig to 
MacArthur, 26 March 1943, RG 16, Box 29, MA; Fertig to 
MacArthur, 20 October 1943, RG 16, Box 30, MA; Fertig to 
MacArthur, 25 November 1343, RG 16, Box 30, MA; Fertig to 
MacArthur, 28 November 1943, RG 16, Box 50, MA; Fertig to 
MacArthur, 11 May 1944, RG 16, Box 30, MA; "Allied 
Translator and Interpreter Service Current Translations," 2 
February 1945, RG 3, Box 146, MA. The author could not
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The Japanese never separated the partisan force from 
its support base— the people. Peasants continued to pass 
information on enemy activity to the partisans. This 
intelligence allowed the resistance to disperse units before 
a massive enemy attack and to reassemble to strike the 
Japanese when they returned to their base camps. Peasants 
continued to join the partisans and to replace casualties. 
Because Filipinos and Moros regarded the enemy as 
unappeasable, further Japanese movements through Bukidncn, 
Agusan and Surigao only made the Mindanaoans more determined 
to assist the partisans.
The Japanese never formed effective spy groups among 
the population to infiltrate the partisans and guide 
Japanese patrols to the partisan infrastructure. Such a 
capability would have given the Japanese the means to 
capture or assassinate partisan commanders and propartisan 
political leaders. If the Japanese succeeded in killing 
enough partisan leaders, this would have disrupted the 
partisan intelligence net that the enemy feared so much. 
Instead, the Japanese coerced Filipino policemen into these 
units. These Filipinos were rarely loyal to their Japanese 
masters. The infiltration effort of the resistance into 
these units was so successful that by October 1944 the 
partisans knew not only the strength of former Filipino 
policemen on Mindanao (3,000 according to Fertig) but each
locate any Japanese documents that confirmed or denied these 
events.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
company commander's name and the location of his 
headquarters. The Japanese Army on Mindanao relied too 
heavily on its conventional combat power to defeat the 
partisans and therefore it neglected to purge unenthusiastic 
police or partisan spies from its units.24
The failure of the Japanese offensives in the spring 
and summer of 1944 to destroy the resistance was the turning 
point in the battle for Mindanao. Because the Japanese were 
too busy building defenses against potential U.S. landings 
at the Davao and Zamboanga Cities, they were too occupied to 
launch any more major offensives against the Mindanao 
partisans. The Japanese deployed one division near Davao 
City and three battalions near Zamboanga City. Partisan 
units in every province reoccupied their lost areas. From 
September 1944 until the U.S. landings in April 1945, the 
resistance was able to concentrate most of its energy on 
completing its intelligence network to assist U.S. landings 
without being disrupted by major Japanese offensives.25
The partisans fought against the enemy offensives in 
1943 and 1944 with a combination of active and passive 
strategies. They gathered information on enemy activities 
and prepared their ambushes. The flexible partisan
24,lReport on the Bureau of Constabulary Organization, 
Philippines," 10 October 1944, RG 16, Box 1, MA; Merchant 
letter; Jonassen letter; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 
333-67.
25,lSummary of Enemy Situation," 7 November 1944, RG 
16, Box 3, MA; Cannon, Leyte, 52.
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ambush-and-run tactics nullified superior Japanese firepower 
and bought tine for escape. Partisan attacks on the Sayre 
Road forced the ener.y to immobilize perhaps 1,000 men to 
guard the road. The Japanese never developed effective spy 
networks among the partisans, and Japanese troops were never 
able to inflict great harm on the partisans.
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CHAPTER 5 
SUPPORTING U.S. OPERATIONS
The Mindanao partisans had to send information on 
Japanese sea and land operations and/or develop their combat 
strength to assist U.S. landings if they were to have a 
significant impact on the Pacific War. Because the 
resistance was so large, it had the potential to report 
Japanese activities which would reduce the possible 
surprises for U.S. forces in the Pacific and those that 
would land on Mindanao. Because the partisans lacked formal 
intelligence and radio training, this was a difficult task. 
If the landing forces did not control partisan operations, 
it would have been impossible for the partisans and U.S. 
forces to apply simultaneous pressure on the Japanese 
garrison. This could have resulted in a needlessly longer 
campaign for U.S. forces.
MacArthur was well aware of how valuable coastwatchers 
were in the Pacific War and he wanted such men on Mindanao. 
Coastwatchers in the Solomon Islands radioed the locations 
of enemy troop convoys headed for Guadalcanal; so, the U.S. 
Navy was able to intercept and destroy most of them before 
they could land reinforcements that could have destroyed the 
hard-pressed U.S. Marines. MacArthur relied on Fertig to 
implement an intelligence gathering and reporting system.
84
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Partisan spies living near the Japanese garrisons were in a 
prime position to give MacArthur's planners raw data on the 
Japanese so that enemy weaknesses could be exploited.1
SWPA HQ gave Fertig the coastwatcher station locations 
it desired. He passed the orders to the province commanders 
who placed some of their men at such locations. The 
partisan coastwatcher stations gradually spread to all of 
the coasts of Mindanao. By June 1944, a coastwatcher 
station was near the important Basilan and Surigao Straits 
as well as in every province.2
SWPA HQ gave the partisan coastwatchers important 
instructions for their dangerous mission. Lieutenant 
Colonel Steve Mellnick, U.S. Army, who was on Willoughby's 
staff, sent copies of the "Philippine Intelligence Guide" to 
the partisans to help them send more specific reports on 
enemy attacks and movements. Four net control stations on 
Mindanao that were responsible for making anyone who used
the frequency identify himself for greater security, passed
the coastwatcher reports to Fertig who then sent them to 
SWPA HQ. Whitney criticized some radio stations for not 
reporting in at scheduled times or not following the orders
ionassen letter; Bowler letter; Spector, Eagle 
Against the Sun. 166-78, 458-59.
information Report No. 211, 14 April 1943; Fertig to 
MacArthur, 18 May 1943, RG 16, Box 17, MA; Fertig to
Parsons, 10 September 1943, RG 16, Box 13, MA; Parsons to
McCallum, 11 January 1944, RG 16, Box 6, MA; Whitney to 
Chief of Staff, 21 March 1944, RG 16, Box 1, MA; James,
Years of MacArthur. 2:507-11.
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of the various Mindanao partisan and SWPA HQ net control 
stations. Radios were rather complex for men who were not 
trained for them so such problems were inevitable. Their 
"on-the-job" training included fighting malaria and avoiding 
enemy patrols but they became more skillful operators. SWPA 
HQ code books that allowed the operators to change 
frequencies at certain times to confuse enemy radio 
direction finders kept most radio stations secure. Due to 
these frequency changes, the Japanese had to search a 
frequency spectrum about 1000 kilocycles wide. This search 
required two instruments to pinpoint a suspicious area in 
less than five minutes to locate the partisan radio. If the 
partisans followed proper radio procedures and kept their 
transmissions under five minutes, they could usually escape 
detection.3
The typical coastwatcher led a potentially perilous 
life. He had to keep his radio transmissions to the net 
control station short to avoid detection by enemy radio 
direction finders in the area. Due to the fact that he 
required a hilltop position to see the most area, the
3"Guerrilla Radio Correspondence Map," January 1945,
RG 23a, Box 12, MA; Gerald Chapman, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. 
Air Force, (ret.), letter to author, 7 November 1989;
Samples letter; MacArthur to Fertig, Smith, Abcede, Peralta, 
Kangleon, Cushing, Inginiero and Young, 2 August 1944, RG 
16, Box 5, MA; William Johnson, M.D., D.D.S., letter to 
author, 28 June 1990; Mellnick, Philippine Diarv. 288-89. 
SWPA HQ sent Johnson and other coastwatchers pamphlets that 
assigned codes to diagrams of different types of Japanese 
merchant ships. The coastwatcher radioed that code along 
with the location of the vessel to Fertig's station.
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coastwatcher was vulnerable to visual detection by enemy 
aircraft and to radio direction finders. Suitable locations 
for sighting Japanese ships in important straits and other 
narrow water passages were also predictable targets for 
enemy observation. Because the coastwatcher and his 
assistants could not defend themselves against a Japanese 
patrol, they had to be ready to destroy their equipment and 
quickly escape. In Surigao Province, partisan ambushes were 
so effective at defeating small Japanese patrols that had 
the mobility to find coastwatchers, that the Japanese only 
sent larger and noisier patrols which gave coastwatchers 
enough warning to escape.
The coastwatchers gave the U.S. Navy valuable 
information despite the dangers. These stations sent their 
messages to the net control stations, which in turn sent 
them to Fertig's headquarters. Ke radioed the intelligence 
to SWPA HQ which passed it to the U.S. Navy. On 6-7 April 
1944, coastwatchers tracked a powerful Japanese naval force 
that the partisans believed to be five battleships, one 
heavy cruiser, and five destroyers moving westward through 
the Basilan Straits just south of Zamboanga City and then 
northeastward along the western coast of Mindanao. A 
station on the Agusan Province coast also reported this 
force later. The U.S. Seventh Fleet Intelligence staff 
absorbed this data into their records in order to improve 
their knowledge of Japanese activities. In June 1944, 
Fertig's coastwatchers also tracked and reported the
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Japanese First Mobile Fleet that moved from Tawi Tavi in the 
Sulu Islands and through the Surigao Straits on about 13 
June to attack the U.S. Navy's Task Force 58 near the 
Mariana Islands. Because the partisans sent this 
information, U.S. Navy commanders had more time to plan and 
deploy for their victory in the naval Battle of the 
Philippine Sea, 19-21 June 1944.4
«
The Mindanao human intelligence network provided the 
Japanese with a plausible explanation for how the U.S. 
accquired so much information on Japanese strategy.
MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz utilized extensive 
signal intelligence to provide information to U.S. ground, 
sea, and air commanders. However, every time U.S. forces 
used this information to win battles, they faced the risk of 
alerting the Japanese that their code was broken and forcing 
the Japanese to change their codes. The coastwatcher signal 
traffic on Mindanao and throughout the Philippines was known 
to the Japanese and gave them a plausible explanation for 
how the U.S. knew about Japanese ship movements and 
operations.5
4"Philippine Frequency List," RG 16, Box 7, MA;
Chapman letter; Whitney to Chief of Staff, SWPA, 8 April 
1944, RG 16, Box 1, MA; Mellnick, Philippine Diary. 295-5; 
Spielman, "114th Infantry Regiment," 24; Willoughby, 
Guerrilla Resistance. 348-50; Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy. 
303-10; Spector, Eagle Against the Sun. 458-59.
sAllied Translator and Interpreter Section, Southwest 
Pacific Area Enemy Publications Number 359, RG 3, Box 137, 
MA; Japanese Monograph No. 3, "Philippine Operations Record, 
Phase Two, December 1942 to June 1944," CMH; Spector, Eagle 
Against the Sun. 445-60.
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The Mindanao resistance also increased the 
effectiveness of the U.S. Navy's Third Fleet's devastating 
air raids on Mindanao in September 1944. Thanks to detailed 
partisan intelligence on the locations of Japanese 
airfields, air defense positions and types of aircraft, U.S. 
Naval aircraft knew where to find and destroy Japanese 
planes on Mindanao. Because the information eliminated the 
need for aerial reconnaissance that would have alerted the 
Japanese, the U.S. pilots achieved complete surprise and 
destroyed 60 Japanese planes on the ground and eight in the 
air. This left the island too weak to threaten MacArthur's 
invasion armada with land based aircraft attacks; so, he 
decided to bypass Mindanao and land at Leyte. There American 
forces could cut the Japanese forces in the Philippines in 
half and capture an excellent harbor.6
The partisans also supplied useful intelligence 
material to SWPA HQ by submarine. Thanks to the partisan 
spies who stole Japanese documents from their garrisons, 
Fertig sent Whitney many captured copies of the "Official 
Journal of the Japanese Military Administration," the 
Japanese "Official Gazette," and newspapers. Whitney used 
this material to study Japanese occupation policy. Japanese 
propaganda leaflets added to his data on their threat to the
^ellnick, Philippine Diary. 295-97, Cannon, Leyte,
42-43.
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popular support of the resistance.7
By December 1944, Fertig's intelligence personnel ran 
a communication system which in Whitney's words was "an 
example of guerrilla efficiency." SWPA HQ's guidance and 
the resistance's tenacity were responsible for an 
intelligence force which had a system of more than 58 radio 
stations which included 29 coastwatcher stations. The 
partisans operated a flexible network that was prepared to 
operate under emergency net control stations even if their 
usual control stations and Fertig's headquarters were 
destroyed. Because several stations were prepared to 
perform as net control stations if existing ones were 
destroyed or had to relocate due to Japanese pressure, the 
radio net was flexible.8
MacArthur wanted to liberate Mindanao for military and 
humanitarian reasons. Because the Zamboanga Province 
contained airfields that would help protect the Borneo 
operations that would begin in May 1945, he first wanted to 
liberate Zamboanga Province in March 1945. MacArthur
Philippine Regional Subsection to Chief of Staff,
SWPA, 17 August 1943, RG 16, Box 1, MA; Philippine Regional 
Subsection to Chief of Staff, SWPA, 19 October 1943, RG 16, 
Box 1, MA.
8"General Headquarters, SWPA, Military Intelligence 
Section General Staff Radio Locator Map," 24 February 1944, 
RG 16, 3ox 2, MA; MacArthur to Fertig, Smith, Abcede, 
Peralta, Kangleon, Cushing, Inginiero and Young, 2 August 
1944, RG 16, Box 5, MA; "10th Military District United 
States Forces in the Philippines Radio Communications Report 
No. l," l December 1944, RG 16, Box 7, MA; Whitney to 
Fertig, 21 December 1944, RG 16, Box 11, MA.
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thought that he would need Mindanao and the Visayan Islands 
to stage the giant invasion of Japan. Because MacArthur 
sent Eichelberger's Eighth Army to liberate the Visayas and 
Mindanao instead of reinforcing his hard-pressed Sixth Army 
on Luzon, the Luzon campaign lasted longer than it might 
have. The Visaya, Mindanao, and Borneo operations were 
deviations from his strategy of bypassing strong Japanese 
pockets and maintaining a forward momentum towards Japan. 
MacArthur was aware that strategy is not always dictated 
solely by military considerations. MacArthur knew of the 
brutal Japanese rule and he was afraid that bypassed 
Japanese troops would massacre the indigenous population 
along with prisoners-of-war. Mindanaoans certainly wanted 
MacArthur to free them from the constant Japanese menace as 
soon as possible regardless of the strategic implications.9
Under the protection of U.S. air supremacy over the 
Philippines, Fertig flew to meet with Eichelberger at Leyte 
Island several times before the U.S. landings on Mindanao in 
March 1945. The plan was to coordinate the partisan effort 
with U.S. combat operations. Because unauthorized partisan 
attacks in areas that U.S. forces had to break through could 
draw sufficient Japanese forces to delay or halt the
9Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines. 2d 
ed., U.S. Army in World War Two Series (Washington, D.C.: 
Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1984), 
584-85, 591-97, 620-48; James, Years of MacArthur. 2:738-41, 
755; D. Clayton James, "MacArthur1s Lapses From an 
Envelopment Strategy in 1945," Parameters: Journal of the 
U.S. Army War College 10 (June 1980): 26-32.
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' Americans and upset important operations, the partisans 
needed guidance from Eichelberger. Partisan cooperation 
with the U.S. Eighth Army would enable both forces to assist 
each other during a crisis. Unity of command under the army 
was vital to applying simultaneous pressure on the enemy.10 
Fertig must have left the meetings with a better 
understanding of the scheme for liberation.11
Fertig's conferences with Eichelberger and resistance 
intelligence reports provided the U.S. Army with valuable 
information for the Zamboanga Province landings that would 
commence in March 1945. According to partisan estimates and 
Japanese wartime documents, the resistance gave Eichelberger 
a fairly accurate estimate of the province's 8,900 Japanese 
soldiers and sailors of the 54th Independent Mechanized 
Brigade. Eichelberger's Eighth Army staff created a 
partisan subsection to analyze resistance intelligence.
This staff compared this information with their estimates 
and drew an accurate picture of Japanese capabilities.
Thanks to this information, Eichelberger knew that the 
Japanese planned to fight a few miles north east of 
Zamboanga City where they would be less affected by U.S.
10"Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger's Diary," 25 
January 1945, Eichelberger Papers [hereafter EP], Box 80, 
William Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North 
Carolina [hereafter DU]; Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare.114-17.
11 "Eichelberger's Official Correspondence," 6 March 
1945, EP, Box 7, DU? Smith, Triumph. 592-93, Appendix A-l. 
Eichelberger's Eighth Army consisted cf the 10th, 11th and 
24th Corps.
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naval gunfire. Therefore, he planned to move inland as fast 
as possible to destroy the Japanese.12
Because U.S. units would land near Zamboanga City in 
March 1945, Eighth Army headquarters on Leyte needed to talk 
to partisans who knew about the landing area. Captain Royce 
Wendover, U.S. Army, was a Zamboanga Province partisan and a 
former enlisted sailor who was stationed in Zamboanga City 
before the war. He fled the Japanese and joined the 
guerrillas. He knew much about the geography of where the 
U.S. troops would land. Wendover flew to the Eighth Army 
headquarters. Wendover analyzed photos of the city and his 
knowledge of local terrain helped him identify enemy 
fortifications for Eichelberger's intelligence staff. He 
also pointed out that due to a non-negotiable eight to 
twelve foot sea wall, one of the prospective landing areas 
at the city was impractical. Wendover also identified 
nearby gravel beds that would be required for road and 
airfield construction or repair. . He showed Eighth Army 
planners an estuary that American troops could use to attack 
the city from the north if it was heavily defended on the
12Fertig to MacArthur, 13 February 1945, RG 16, Box 
33, MA; "Staff Study, Operation Victor Four," 12 February 
1945, RG 3, Box 156, MA; "Japanese Plans for the Defense of 
Mindanao," EP, Box 96, DU; Smith, Triumph. 592-93. Smith 
used a postwar interview the U.S. Army conducted with Major 
Jiro Harada of the Japanese Zamboanga garrison and U.S. 
estimates to determine the Japanese strength near Zamboanga 
City.
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southern coast.13
Eichelberger planned to invade Mindanao in two stages. 
First he would land the 41st Division at Zamboanga City on 
10 March 1945. Its main mission was to secure the three 
airfields near the city to cover MacArthur's prospective 
invasion of Borneo in May 1945. Then the division was to 
secure the rest of the province. Then from 17 to 22 April, 
the 31st and 24th U.S. Divisions of the 10th Corps would 
land at Malabang and Parang Cities. The 24th Division's 
objective was to capture Davao City and clear the rest of 
the province of enemy troops. The 31st Division had to 
secure the Sayre Road and liberate Northern Mindanao.14
Eichelberger wanted an airfield that would be close 
enough to protect his Zamboanga City beachhead; so, in 
February 1945 he ordered a U.S. Marine fighter bomber 
squadron from Marine Air Group 12 to a partisan-controlled 
airfield at Dipolog in northern Zamboanga Province. A 
partisan battalion of 500 men defended this important 
airfield. The Japanese launched several strong attacks, and 
they forced the partisans closer to the airfield. The 
partisans and Marine pilots worked together to halt the 
enemy incursions at Dipolog. The partisans provided 
security while the planes refueled and the pilots made
13Royce Wendover, "Special Assignment G-3 to 8th 
Army," "Foreshadows," WP, CB.
14Smith, Triumph, 591-96, 624; James, Years of 
MacArthur 2:755.
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strafing runs on enemy spearheads. The best example of this 
partisan-Marine teamwork occurred on 27 March, 1945 when 150 
elite Japanese troops were only 16 kilometers from Dipolog. 
The partisan commander, Major Donald Hills, U.S. Army, knew 
the enemy locations but he lacked maps and radio to direct 
the pilots; so, he rode with one pilot and guided four 
planes against the Japanese. The enemy retreated and the 
partisans were spared what would have been a costly 
battle.15
Japanese forces on Mindanao were not well-prepared for 
the coming battles. Only 15,000 of the 43,000 troops in the 
Japanese 30th and 100th divisions were qualified 
infantrymen. The 30th Division's main defense area was 
along the Sayre Road in Bukidnon Province. It lost four of 
its nine battalions in the Leyte battles. The 100th 
Division was deployed north of Davao City. It had only ten 
well-trained officers. The Japanese 54th Independent 
Mechanized Brigade in Zamboanga Province was in poor 
condition to resist the U.S. landings. It had only 8,000 
men. It was isolated from the Japanese 100th and 30th 
Divisions in Eastern Mindanao; so, it had no chance of 
slowing the U.S. liberation. Worst of all, the Japanese 
Commanding General Gyosaku Morozumi drafted no realistic
15Fertig to MacArthur, 10 March 1945, RG 16, Box 34,
MA; Wade Boggs, Marine Aviation in the Philippines 
(Washington D.C.: Historical Division, Headquarters U.S. 
Marine Corps, 1951), 112-17.
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defense plans. He expected each of his divisions to guard 
its own province, lure U.S. forces into a close quarter 
battle in the jungle to cause them as many casualties as 
possible, and not expect reinforcement from another 
province. He did not force the two division commanders to 
link their defenses in order to prevent isolation and 
piecemeal destruction. This failure was symptomatic of 
widespread defeatism among Japanese officers and 
sergeants.16 Other Japanese officers shared General 
Morozumi's belief that American forces would bypass Mindanao 
in 1945, and this led to a less than diligent effort to 
present a coordinated defense.17
U.S. Army forces landed two miles north of Zamboanga 
City on 10 March 1945 and quickly moved inland. Because the 
Japanese had been softened by a seven-day bombardment by the 
U.S. Army Air Forces, the U.S. 41st Division's two infantry 
regiments encountered light opposition. The main American 
operations took place deep inside the jungle north of the 
city where the enemy fought desperately but hopelessly 
against the better-armed Americans.
The Zamboanga partisans gave the 41st Division 
valuable support by harassing the Japanese brigade's retreat 
to Moroc, north of Zamboanga city. The partisans set up
16"Interview of Major Yasura Hanada, Japanese 54th 
Independent Mechanized Brigade," EP, Box 22B, DU; McGee,
Rice and Salt. 9-12, 166-69.
17"Interview with General Gyosaku Morozumi," EP, Box 96, DU.
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strong defenses behind Japanese lines on a series of ridges 
around Moroc. This denied the enemy defense positions badly 
needed to slow down the 163rd U.S. Rifle Regiment. The 
partisans used their thorough knowledge of the area to 
dominate key ridges with heavy weapons and to ambush enemy 
patrols that tried to pass through the valleys. The 
partisans even pushed some enemy elements toward the 
Americans. The Japanese could not take time to drive out 
the partisans; so, they by-passed Moroc and tried to escape 
to the northeastward.18
Local partisans also prevented the enemy 54th 
Independent Mechanized Brigade from occupying key defense 
terrain at Bolong, north of Moroc on the Zamboanga 
Peninsula. A partisan battalion defended this key area and 
killed 51 of the enemy. If the Japanese had retained 
Bolong, they could have fought a guerrilla war from a 
mountain stronghold or they could have retreated up the 
coast road to Eastern Mindanao.
The road blocks the Zamboanga partisans established 
along the western coastal road caused serious problems for 
the retreating enemy brigade which tried to use it. Over 
1,200 Japanese failed to pierce the partisan defenses, and
18,,Palawan and Zamboanga Operations,” EP, Box 22B, DU; 
"Interview of Major Yasura Hanada, Japanese 54th Independent 
Mechanized Brigade,” 14 January 1947, EP, Box 22B, DU; 
"Interview of Gunner Arkoff," Hargis Westerfield Papers, CB; 
William McCartney, The Junqleers: A History of the 41st 
Infantry Division (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 
1948), 143-49; Smith, Triumph. 195-600.
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the relentless U.S. advance pushed the Japanese into very 
mountainous and malaria-infested areas. Because of the 
partisan combat support, more than 7,000 out of the 8,000 
Japanese that fought the U.S. landings died from battle, 
disease, and starvation by the end of the war in September 
1945.19
The partisans compounded the Japanese problems in 
eastern Mindanao before the U.S. landings at Parang and 
Malabang when they made it difficult for the Japanese to 
move between garrisons. Partisan attacks forced enemy 
troops that should have been in a mobile reserve or 
constructing defenses to guard the enemy-held Sayre Road and 
Highway One. The partisans infested every province. They 
cut telegraph wires, blew up bridges, and ambushed enemy 
columns. Partisan raids destroyed almost all the trucks in 
the Japanese 100th Division at Davao City, denying the 
Japanese the mobility to quickly restructure their defenses 
if they had to. Partisan raids and Japanese lack of radio 
parts cut Japanese communications, which increased Japanese 
reaction time to counter potential American landings.20
19Royce Wendover, "War Diary," vol. 2, WP, CB, 561; 
"Palawan and Zamboanga Operations;" "Interview of Major 
Yasura Hanada, Japanese 54th Independent Mechanized 
Brigade," 14 January 1947, EP, Box 22B, DU; "Interview of 
Gunner Arkoff," Hargis Westerfiel Papers, CB; McCartney, 
Junqleers. 143-149; Smith, Triumph. 595-600. The author 
found no evidence that proves that fighting lasted beyond 
the Japanese surrender.
20"Interview with General Jiro Harada," EP, Box 95,
DU; Fertig to MacArthur, 8 February 1945, RG 16, Box 33, MA; 
Fertig to MacArthur, 25 February 1945, RG 16, Box 34, MA.
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Fertig was aware that the U.S. landings would occur at 
Malabang and Parang on 17 April 1945 and ordered that an 
assault be planned in support of the landings to annihilate 
the Japanese garrison at Malabang. He entrusted this task 
to Hedges's Lanao Province partisans. Hedges realized the 
tremendous strength of a well-armed force in buildings; so, 
he assembled nearly 3,000 men and placed them under his best 
combat leader, an escaped Australian infantryman, Major Rex 
Blow. These men faced about 300 Japanese. Blow organized 
the force and planned the attack for a month. If air 
support was required, the battle site was well within range 
of the Marine fighter bombers at Dipolog. The partisans 
also coordinated air support: through MacArthur's 
headquarters. Such air support and close timing to the 
American landings insured that the partisans would be 
rescued if they got into serious trouble.21
The partisans began their attack on 12 March 1945, but 
Japanese bunkers, trenches, tunnels, and minefields slowed 
their advance. Enemy troops used the tunnels to reinforce 
threatened areas inside Malabang. The partisans did not 
have artillery or sufficient heavy machine-guns to pin the 
Japanese, and they relied on ground attack missions from the 
Marine planes from Dipolog and Army bombers from the 13th 
Air Force. Because the friendly planes did not signal that
21Fertig to MacArthur, 24 February 1945, RG 16, Box 
34, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 29 March 1945, RG 16, Box 34, 
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 15 April 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA; 
Samples letter.
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their attacks had been completed, a few partisan attacks 
were aborted. This partisan delay gave dazed Japanese 
defenders time to rally, reoccupy their bunkers, and defeat 
some ground assaults. The airfield at Malabang fell on 
24 March 1945 and allowed the partisans to be resupplied 
there. Major Blow offset the advantages the Japanese had in 
fortifications when he attacked in different places with 
small units while the Moros launched intermittent but 
frightening attacks from many directions at once. Blow's 
men pushed the Japanese into a fort inside the city and 
surrounded them. Two hundred enemy troops broke through the 
partisan ring and escaped.22
Lieutenant Colonel Bowler flew from Mindanao to brief 
the 10th Corps commander, Brigadier General Frank Sibert, on 
partisan and Japanese dispositions. Bowler gave Sibert 
valuable information on partisan capabilities and Japanese 
activity. Because U.S. possession of Kabacan would divide 
enemy forces into two parts, he advised the general to 
capture it. Bowler explained that the Japanese were so 
uncertain about U.S. intentions that they constantly shifted 
troops north and south along the Sayre Road between the 
possible invasion sites at Davao and Cagayan harbors.
Bowler also warned the general of the enemy fortifications 
from Digos to Central Cotabato and made it clear to Sibert 
that the Japanese planned their main defenses along the
22Bowler letter; Samples letter; Blow letter; Fertig 
to MacArthur, 9 March 1945, RG 16, Box 34, MA.
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Sayre Road north of Kabacan and north of Davao City.23
The partisan seizure of Malabang made it easier for 
elements of the U.S. 10th Corps to land on 17 April 1945 and 
to drive inland quickly. Partisan reports that Malabang and 
Parang were secure allowed Eichelberger to shift most of his 
24th Division to Parang where they would be closer to 
Highway One. This enabled two infantry regiments to move 
more quickly on Highway One toward the Kabacan junction in 
an attempt to split the Japanese 30th Division to the north 
from the enemy 100th Division to the south near Davao. 
Because the 24th Division moved so rapidly, the Japanese did 
not have enough time to delay the Americans along Highway 
One. The Japanese forces at Kabacan were unable to prepare 
adequate defenses before the U.S. forces crashed down on 
them on 23 April. With Kabacan lost, the enemy in Davao was 
isolated from the Japanese on Sayre Road, and neither enemy 
force assisted the other in the upcoming battles.24
The Davao Province partisans assisted the 24th Division 
during the battle for the Davao area. Lauretta's 
2,038 men were a few miles north of the Japanese defenses at 
Davao. The U.S. 24th Division pounded the Japanese defenses 
from the southeast in May. The partisans were not armed
^Bowler letter; Smith, Triumph. 620-47.
24Fertig to MacArthur, 12 March 1945, RG 16, Box 34,
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 8 April 1945, RG 16, Box 34, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 10 April 1945, RG 16, Box 34, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 12 April 1945, RG 16, Box 34, MA;
Fertig to MacArthur, 13 April 1945; RG 16, Box 34, MA;
Smith, Triumph. 620-30.
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well enough to assault the Japanese; so, they attacked their 
outposts and patrols. Partisans defended small airstrips 
for American artillery observation planes. The partisans 
also guarded roads that led northward in order to cut off 
any enemy reinforcements from strengthening Davao. Because 
the Japanese sought to escape the devastating U.S. 
firepower, they began to move north against Lauretta's men. 
The partisans informed the 24th Division of the Japanese 
movements. Lauretta rebuffed some Japanese northward probes 
but he was not strong enough to stop their retreat from the 
U.S. troops, and some Japanese escaped into the jungle.25
While the Battle for Davao raged, the Bukidnon 
partisans assisted U.S. 31st Division operations on the 
Sayre Road. The division landed near Parang on 22 April 
1945. The Americans and Filipinos faced a weak force of 
5,800 enemy infantry and 9,500 poorly trained service 
troops. The Filipinos used their stealth to creep up and 
observe Japanese activities. Partisan units showed great 
skill in scouting for intelligence and then leaving an area 
before they were caught between U.S. and Japanese patrols. 
Because the Filipinos knew their trails well, U.S. 
commanders attached the partisans to U.S. patrols where they 
helped the Americans find the Japanese. Other partisans
^Fertig to MacArthur, 2 May 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA; 
Fertig to MacArthur, 4 May 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA; Fertig 
to MacArthur, 5 May 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA; Fertig to 
MacArthur, 6 May 1945; RG 16, Box 35, MA; Marshall 
telephone conversation; Willoughby, Guerrilla Resistance. 
542-43; Smith, Triumph. 624.
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assisted American engineers in the repair of roads so that 
American troops were well-supplied from their lorries on the 
Sayre Road.26
When the Filipinos and Americans pushed the Japanese 
off of the Sayre Road in May, partisan harassment continued 
against the Japanese. The Filipinos continued to guide U.S. 
patrols down the fastest routes to attack the retreating 
Japanese. A U.S. infantry battalion landed at Butuan Bay on 
25 June 1945. The partisans guided it to the last Japanese 
defenses at Waloe and helped the Americans scatter the 
enemy. The Filipinos hunted down Japanese survivors until 
the war ended on Mindanao in August 1945. 27
The Mindanao partisans gave U.S. forces valuable 
support in 1944-1945. They built an intelligence net that 
reported Japanese naval movements to the U.S. Navy, and the 
partisans informed MacArthur1s staff of Japanese strength 
and activities. This information allowed the U.S. Navy to 
destroy more Japanese ships during the Battle for the 
Philippine Sea. Coastwatcher radio traffic provided the 
Japanese with another reason besides codebreaking as to how
26Jonassen letter; Fertig to MacArthur, 5 May 1945, RG 
16, Box 35, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 15 May 1945, RG 16, Box 
35, MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 21 May 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA; 
Fertig to MacArthur, 23 May 1945, RG 16, Box 35, MA; Smith, Triumph. 624.
27Fertig to MacArthur, 12 June 1945, RG 16, Box 36,
MA; Fertig to MacArthur, 19 June 1945, RG 16, Box 36, MA; 
Fertig to MacArthur, 27 June 1945, RG 16, Box 36, MA; Fertig 
to MacArthur; 1 July 1945; RG 16, Box 36, MA; Smith,
Triumph. 635-47.
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U.S. forces knew so much about Japanese plans. Partisan 
information on Japanese airfields enabled U.S. aircraft to 
neutralize any air threat to MacArthur's invasion of Leyte. 
The resistance also allowed MacArthur's troops to exploit 
the weaknesses of the Japanese on Mindanao. The partisans 
rendered valuable combat support when they protected a U.S. 
Marine airfield at Dipolog, harassed Japanese retreats, 
cleared beachheads, guarded another airfield for U.S. 
spotter aircraft, and guided U.S. patrols through the jungle 
trails.
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CONCLUSION
The U.S.-led Mindanao resistance force was transformed 
from an independent guerrilla force in 1942 to a partisan 
unit in 1943 that supported U.S. Army and Navy operations 
with intelligence and combat assistance. In late 1942 and 
early 1943, Moros and Filipinos as well as unsurrendered 
American soldiers formed separate guerrilla groups that 
addressed local needs for civil government and protection 
from Japanese patrols and indigenous bandits. Fertig and 
his American province commanders convinced Filipinos and 
Moros that they could protect their families best with 
organized guerrilla warfare. Because the resistance was 
adept at eluding Japanese forces, the Japanese never 
destroyed it. Fertig and his province commanders also built 
an intelligence system that reported Japanese strength and 
activities to SWPA HQ and the U.S. Navy. When U.S. forces 
landed on Mindanao in 1945, the partisans cleared 
beachheads, blocked Japanese retreats, and collected 
intelligence.
The Mincanaoans' hostile reaction to the brutal 
Japanese occupation was predictable and was a foundation for 
the Mindanao resistance. The inhabitants had a guerrilla 
war tradition that began against the Spanish and continued 
against the Americans in 1898. The Moros feared that U.S.
105
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troops would be as harsh as the Spanish; so, they fought the 
U.S. garrison for 13 years. Pershing used minimum force 
against the guerrillas and established economic programs 
that gave Moro businessmen significant profits and reduced 
the fears of many Moro leaders. The Japanese occupation 
policy in Mindanao during World War II was very different. 
The Japanese authorities tried to terrorize Moros and 
Catholic Filipinos into submission with rape, torture, and 
unnecessary destruction. Japanese commanders made no real 
attempt to earn the trust of the indigenous population.
Most villagers and townspeople were too proud or vengeful to 
cooperate with the Japanese.
Seven resistance leaders organized their guerrillas in 
the provinces. The leaders used the most influential men to 
gain local support. Four of the seven leaders were American 
officers who had several years of prewar duty in the 
Philippines and who understood how to work with the 
population. The other three guerrilla leaders were 
Mindanaoans with exceptional organizational skills, except 
Morgan. Brutal Japanese soldiers murdered Filipinos and 
Moros while indigenous bandits stole food from Moros and 
Filipinos. These guerrilla leaders organized their men into 
units that ambushed Japanese patrols and Mindanaoan bandit 
groups. The various guerrilla commanders reduced local 
hardships by forming civil governments which tried to meet 
most peasant requirements for food and shelter. These 
guerrilla leaders gained local support to make the guerrilla
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units stronger by providing a source for replacement of 
casualties and recruits.
Due to Fertig's engaging personality, senior rank, and 
official recognition from MacArthur, most guerrilla leaders 
quickly joined him. Fertig transferred one rebel, Morgan, 
out of Mindanao. Fertig separated two rival guerrilla 
leaders and thus halted their fighting. He clarified each 
province commander's area of operation in order to use the 
available manpower more efficiently. Most of Fertig's 
province commanders were Americans. Because all were 
members of the same military culture as the army they 
supported, Americans were best suited to making the 
resistance conform to MacArthur's objectives. Only one man 
could assign missions so that they could be accomplished in 
an orderly manner. Fertig's subordinate commanders insured 
that the intelligence and combat missions were accomplished.
The American partisan commanders survived two major 
Japanese offensives with active and passive strategies. The 
Japanese patrols were either too large to be stealthy or too 
small and uncoordinated to avoid partisan ambushes or catch 
fleeing partisans. Partisan commanders gathered information 
from spies for setting up deadly ambushes along likely 
Japanese avenues of approach. Partisan attacks along the 
Sayre Road forced the enemy to employ roughly 1,000 men to 
guard the road. This guard duty denied those Japanese the 
ability to launch offensive operations against the 
partisans. By not allowing themselves to be destroyed in
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battle, the partisans survived to support MacArthur's 
return.
The partisans gave U.S. forces valuable support. In 
accordance with SWPA HQ directives, the partisans built an 
intelligence system that reported enemy ground, air and sea 
activities. Partisan coastwatchers gave the U.S. Navy 
information on the route of a Japanese fleet before it 
attacked the American ships. Resistance information on 
Japanese airfields on Mindanao enabled U.S. Naval aircraft 
to devastate Japanese planes on the island. Partisan radio 
traffic to Australia provided the Japanese another reason as 
to how the U.S. recieved Japanese intelligence besides the 
possibility that Americans broke the Japanese code. This 
event helped make it safer for MacArthur to invade Leyte 
Island. Partisan intelligence gave the 10th Corps planners 
an accurate picture of Japanese strengths and locations 
before the American landings on Mindanao occurred. The 
partisans further assured the security of the landings when 
they cleared 200 enemy troops from the landing area at 
Malabang City. After the 10th Corps landed, the partisans 
gave it important combat assistance. Partisans harassed and 
blocked Japanese retreats, which made it easier for U.S. 
troops to destroy or capture the enemy. The partisans were 
not decisive in destroying the enemy garrison on Mindanao, 
but they enabled a swifter campaign by the U.S. 10th Corps.
So that these lessons might be applied to upcoming 
events with an open mind, future historians and military
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
analysts should keep the following checklist in mind when 
analyzing similar events. Do the partisan leaders 
understand the indigenous culture and thus convince the 
local population to follow them? Would they know how to 
defeat rebellions within their organizations without causing 
a civil war? Do the armed forces have the capability to 
supply the partisans and assist their leaders in unifying 
and training the men? Do the partisans understand how to 
use the terrain to their advantage? Would these partisans 
be able to collect and send enemy intelligence without 
leaving themselves too vulnerable to enemy offensives?
Could the resistance leaders train their people to operate 
radios and collect accurate information? Would the partisan 
leaders be able to support their military's operations with 
reliable intelligence, guide troops to enemy locations, and 
participate in combat operations?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
SOURCES CONSULTED
ARCHIVAL SOURCES
Author's Document Collection. "America Keeps Her Promises." 
pamphlet. n.p., circa 1942 or 1943.
Center of Military History. Washington, D.C. Japanese
Monograph No. 3, "Philippine Operations Record, Phase 
Two, December 1942 to June 1944."
Eichelberger, Robert, Papers. Boxes 7, 22B, 80, 95, 96. 
William Perkins Library, Duke University. Durham,
North Carolina.
Hayden, Joseph, Papers. Boxes 41, 42. Bentley
Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia. Papers and documents 
in the following Record Groups and boxes:
Record Group 3, Boxes 145, 146, 156 
Record Group 16, Boxes 1, 3, 5, 6,
7, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 29, 33, 34, 35,
44, 45, 46
Record Group 23A, Box 12.
Record Group 30, Box 24.
O'Connor, Patrick, Papers. St. Columban's Archives, 
Bellview, Nebraska.
Wendover, Royce, Papers. U.S. Army Military History 
Institute. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
Westerfield, Hargis, Papers. U.S. Army Military History 
Institute. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS
Blow, Rex, Major, Australian Army (ret.). Letter to 
author, 1 September 1989.
Bowler, Robert, Colonel, U.S. Army (ret.). Letter with 
enclosures to author, 30 September 1989.
________. Telephone conversation, 21 June 1990.
110
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ill
Chapman, Gerald, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force (ret.). 
Letter to author, 7 November 1989.
Childress, Clyde, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, (ret.). 
Letter to author, 17 November 1989.
Grashio, Samuel, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, (ret.). Letter to 
author, 18 June 1989.
Johnson, William, M.D., D.D.S. Letter with enclosures to 
author, 28 June 1990.
Jonassen, Erling, Captain, U.S. Army, (ret.). Letter to 
author, 3 July 1989.
Marshall, Paul, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, (ret.). 
Telephone conversation, 1 October 1989.
Merchant, Robert, Lieutenant, U.S. Army, (ret.). Letter to 
author, 2 October 1989.
Newton, Ken, Sergeant., U.S. Army, (ret.). Letter to 
author, 24 July, 1989.
Richardson, Iliff, Lieutenant, U.S. Navy, (ret.). Letter to 
author, 7 November 1989.
Samples, Jack, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, (ret.).
Letter and enclosures to author, 30 September 1989.
Shofner, Austin, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,
(ret.). Letter to author, 4 December 1989.
Spielman, Robert, Captain, U.S. Army, (ret.). Telephone 
conversation, 20 June 1990.
PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES
Grashio, Samuel and Bernard Norling. Return to Freedom. 
Tulsa: MCN Press, 1982.
Haggerty, Edward. Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao. New York: 
Longman's, Green and Co,, 1946.
Hawkins, Jack. Never Sav Die. Philadelphia: Dorrance and Co., 1966.
Ind, Allison. Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret
Weapon in the War Against Japan. New York: Van Rees, 
1958.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
112
Kuder, Edward M. "The Philippines Never Surrendered,"
The Saturday Evening Post. 10, 17, 24 February; 3, 10 
March 1945.
Mao, Tse Tung. On Guerrilla Warfare. New York; Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1961.
McGee, John. Rice and Salt: A History of the Defense and 
Occupation of Mindanao during World War Two. San Antonio: The Naylor Co., 1963.
Mellnick, Steve. Philippine Diarv 1941-1945. New York: Van 
Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1969.
Villamor, Jesus. They Never Surrendered. Quezon City, 
Philippines: Vera-Reyes, 1982.
Willoughby, Charles A. The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in 
The Philippines. New York: Vantage Press, 1972.
PUBLISHED SECONDARY SOURCES
Agoncillo, Theodoro. A Short History of the Philippines. 
New York: New American Library, 1969.
Boggs, Wade. Marine Aviation in the Philippines.
Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Headquarters, 
U.S. Marine Corps, 1951.
Cannon, M. Hamlin. Levte: The Return to the Philippines.
2d ed. U.S. Army in World War II Series, Washington, 
D.C.: Center of Military History, Department of the 
Army, 1987.
Chaliand, Gerard. Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical 
Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Trans, and ed. Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1984.
Dower, John. War Without Mercv: Race and Power in the 
Pacific War. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986.
Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese 
Navy 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
1978.
Forbes, Cameron. The Philippine Islands. Vol. 2. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
Gann, Lewis. Guerrillas in History. Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1979.
Heilbrunn, Otto. Partisan Warfare. New York: Praeger,
1962.
Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War 1931-1945: A Critical 
Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II. New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1978.
Ingham, Travis. Rendezvous bv Submarine. Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1945.
Iriye, Akira. The Origins of the Second World War in Asia 
anc the Pacific. Origins of Modem Wars Series, ed. 
Harold Hearder. New York: Longman, 1987.
James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur. Vol. 2.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1975.
________. "MacArthur's Lapses From an Envelopment
Strategy in 1945," Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army 
War College. 10 (June 1980): 26-32.
Karnow, Stanley. In Our Image: America's Empire in the 
Philippines. New York: Random House, 1989.
Keats, John. They Fought Alone. New York and Philadelphia: 
J.B. Lippincott Co., 1963.
Kennedy, Paul. Pacific Onslaught 7 December 1941-7 February 
1943. New York: Ballantine Books, 1972.
Kiefer, Thomas. The Tausuq: Violence and Law in a
Philippine Moslem Society. New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1972.
McCartney, William. The Juncleers: A History of the 41st
Infantry Division. Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal 
Press, 1948.
Morten, Lcuis. The Fall of the Philippines. 2d ed., U.S. 
Army in World War I„' Series, Washington, D.C.: Office 
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1978.
Netzorg, Morton. The Philippines in World War Two: An
Annotated Bibliography. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
Reyes, Jose G. Terrorism and Redemption. Manila: n.p., 
1945.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
Smith, Robert R. Triumph in the Philippines. 2d ed., U.S. 
Army in World War II Series, Washington, D.C.: Center 
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1984.
Smythe, Donald. Guerrilla Warrior. New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1973.
spector, Ronald. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War 
with Japan. New York: Vintage Books, 1985.
Thomas, Ralph. Asia for Asiatics. Illigan City, Mindanao 
Island: Dansr.lan Research Center, 1977.
Toland, John. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the 
Japanese Empire 1936-1945. New York: Bantam Books, 
1986.
Vandiver, Frank. Black Jack. College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1977.
Wolfert, Ira. American Guerrilla in the Philippines. New 
York: Bantam Books, 1980.
THESES AND DISSERTATIONS
Spielman, Robert. "History of the 114th Infantry Regiment." 
Master's Thesis, University of Texas, 1953.
Thomas, Ralph. "Muslim but Filipino: The Integration of 
Philippine Muslims 1917-1946." Ph.D. diss.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1971.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CebuNeqros
lOWdt
> \ I Islands—‘N C 1 w
( /  M  51




Is la n d SU®JC\0
t ta c a ja la r  nay I.
L ia r .n .)^ ^ L ia n o a  la y
Kaloc
Iligan 
lolaab09an Atjusan R iw r
LANM) PHWINCE
DWAi* PW '/iNCT  
ao Penal Oo.or.y ^
X?





rusilan Strait n o r o  C u l t Di-ms
f
EVw.iO Cul IMindanao River
• Quluan
• Cities, towels or villa9cs
MINDANAO ISLAND 
(Source: Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Philippines Map)
Scale: 1" =.60 miles
115












PHILIPI OSIE SEA MARIANA ISLANDS
PHILIPPINES
CAROLINE ISLANDS






^  ISLANDSJAVA SEA
^^TIMOR
AUSTRALIA CORAL SEA
WESTERN PACIFIC - 1942 
(Source: Dull, Imperial Japanese Navy, 96-97) 
Scale: 1" = 600 miles
116 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
